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ABSTRACT
Recent trends show that the popularity of Social Networks (SNs) has been increasing
rapidly. From daily communication sites to online communities, an average person’s daily life
has become dependent on these online networks. Additionally, the number of people using at
least one of the social networks have increased drastically over the years. It is estimated that
by the end of the year 2020, one-third of the world’s population will have social accounts.
Hence, user privacy protection has gained wide acclaim in the research community. It has
also become evident that protection should be provided to these networks from unwanted
intruders. In this dissertation, we consider data privacy on online social networks at the
network level and the user level.
The network-level privacy helps us to prevent information leakage to third-party users
like advertisers. To achieve such privacy, we propose various schemes that combine the
privacy of all the elements of a social network: node, edge, and attribute privacy by clustering
the users based on their attribute similarity. We combine the concepts of k-anonymity and
l-diversity to achieve user privacy.
To provide user-level privacy, we consider the scenario of mobile social networks as the
user location privacy is the much-compromised problem. We provide a distributed solution
where users in an area come together to achieve their desired privacy constraints. We also
consider the mobility of the user and the network to provide much better results.
INDEX WORDS: Data privacy, Social networks, User data, K-anonymity, Mobile
social networks, Location based services, Dynamic clustering
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Social Networks (SNs) have attracted millions of people worldwide from the time they
were introduced. In today’s world, they have become an indispensable part of every human’s
life. There are many ways in which a social network is defined. According to Webster [1],
a social network is nothing but a network of people. However, it is clear from our usage
of social networks these days that it is so much beyond connecting people. Social networks
are often used for online communication and hence, can be referred to as Online Social
Networks (OSNs). They are now not just a means of communication between people. The
social network industry has grown and spread its business into every part of ou daily life.
More and more social networks are emerging every day for various requirements, and every
social network is a booming business model. Some of the early social media sites include
Friendster, Six Degrees, Orkut, and so on. Orkut became one of the premier OSN sites
in Brazil and India during 2007 [2]. Another popular instant messaging system, QQ, was
in widespread use in China is introduced in 1999 [3]. However, today’s market is hugely
dominated by Facebook and Instagram that combinedly has about 290 million users [4].
The main purpose of an OSN site is to provide web services that will allow users to
perform the below actions:
1. Have a public profile to present to other users.
2. Have friends/connections to communicate with them
3. Search for new friends based on their various attributes like common friends, interests,
and so on.
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The above functionalities are the basic functionalities based on which a social network
is initially developed. Hence, we categorize all the social networks into one/more of the
following categories based on the works done by [5] [6] [7].
1. Personal networks. OSNs like Facebook, Friendster and MySpace are some examples
of this category. This category of networks focuses on creating a detailed user’s profile.
Hence they allow many attributes for a single user.
2. Status update networks. Twitter is the best example of this category. These
networks mainly focus on posting a status update. These updates might sometimes
include a place or person.
3. Shared-interest networks. This category of networks focuses on bringing people
with similar interests together. Dating apps like Tinder and professional apps like
LinkedIn are examples of this category.
4. Neighborhood Exploring networks. These networks highly focus on user’s current
and exact location. Based on user’s location, he will be able to share information, media
files and interact with neighborhood people. Tinder is also an example of this category.
With more and more increase in the demand for various functionalities, social networks
now do not belong to a single category. They are trying to expand and provide more features
to please the users. For example, Facebook was initially a personal network, and now it can
be considered as all the four categories mentioned above.
In today’s world, social networks have developed into multi-goal applications. They
are not just used to connect people but for business, finding local businesses, dating, job
search, and many more. Also, as mobile phones boom started in the early 2000s, every
major business website tried to enter the mobile application world. That formed the basis
for the development of Mobile Social Networks (MSNs). With the introduction of 4G and
LTE, internet speeds have skyrocketed, and the mobile applications started using real-time
data of the mobile user. All the social network providers have their mobile application that
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supports various functionalities. Hence, a social network is now divided into OSN and MSN
applications. Although MSN is a part of OSN, there are more complications when privacy is
to be provided for mobile users compared to a stationary user. In the following section, let
us examine the privacy threats on OSN, and later in section 1.3, we will examine the privacy
threats in MSN.
1.2 Privacy threats in OSN
Usage of Online social Networks is ever-increasing. In 2017, 71 percent of all internet
users were using some kind of social networking site. It is expected that by the end of
2019, there will be 2.77 billion social network users. This constitutes 2/3rd of the world’s
population [8]. Hence, it is clear that the vast majority of the population uses OSN, and
their profiles are online. As the initial OSN sites were introduced, connections in OSN were
only based on real-life friends. As the market grew and people started to explore, OSNs now
offers a wide range of friend-finding systems. We can now find friends based on the place
we live, common interests, common friends, and so on. Hence, the public profile of a user
has become an important part of one’s profile. Without correct information about a user,
it is difficult to find things or people that he would be interested in. Hence, users need to
have a profile that contains personal information, including their date of birth to a recent
place that they have visited. Also, this public profile contains a lot of sensitive information
like age, gender, profession, current area, and so on, that includes his / her photo(s). As
discussed before, public profiles are a common feature of any OSN. Due to this fact, a huge
amount of personal data is vulnerable to attacks.
One of the biggest scandals of 2018 is the Cambridge Analytica. According to CNBC,
The Guardian, The Observer, and the New York Times, it is suspected that two of the
biggest social media sites Facebook and Analytica allegedly used user’s personal information
for the 2016 presidential election in the USA. It is claimed that 50 million user profiles have
been mined to send them personalized messages that contributed to the election results.
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Some of the common intentions of attacks that concentrate on the privacy violation of
the users are:
1. Behavioral advertising is one of the most profitable businesses using social network
profiles. Business models use a person’s profile to personalize advertisements tailored to
users. Products that the people interested in, if offered, have a high chance of purchase.
Hence, this industry has become one of the main income of any social networking site.
However, these business models use various user information such as the location of the
user, relationship status, and so on. Google, Facebook, and Twitter use such models.
We can see such advertisements on Facebook by changing a single attribute such as
relationship status [9]. In cases like this, data is often leaked to a third party advertiser
unintentionally. An incident like this happened with Facebook, where six million users’
phone numbers and email addresses to unauthorized users for a year [10].
2. Identity theft uses an individual’s personal information often for financial gain. The
information posted on users’ social network profiles is used to steal their identity. In
2009, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University had found that the data extracted
from social networks and other online public databases can lead to the discovery of
partial or full social security numbers [11].
3. Stalking / Child Abuse One of the early privacy cases in this regard occurred in 2010
on MySpace, where minors were bullied and led to the adoption of “age requirements
and other safety measures”. Another crime committed by Peter Chapman in 2009,
who falsely obtained an identity of another person on Facebook and lured and raped
a 17-year-old girl [12]. Events such as stalking and “catfishing” are frequent in present
society and hence has become a prominent topic in social network security.
1.3 Privacy threats in MSN
The primary advantage of such MSN applications is that they provide various services
like LBS, virtual reality, online dating, and so on. Among them, location-based queries are
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the most widely used service. Online Social Network (OSN) has become a host for various
business advertisements. These business models include hotels, restaurants, vacation spots,
and sports. Users of OSN visiting these business models tend to review them, which helps
other users visit them. Hence the business owners maintain very detailed information of
their business, such as location, menu, phone numbers, and address. As the mobile internet
has exploded with its increasing speed, humongous mobile applications have been developed
in the past years. Similarly, all the OSN providers have their mobile-based applications
designed to provide a more convenient and faster way to access their accounts on the go.
MSN applications offer various advantages, including LBS, that help users to search for
nearby business models.
LBSs have been gaining very considerable popularity by the rapid advances in position-
ing technologies, e.g., Global Position System (GPS), and the development of modern smart
devices with data communication capabilities. LBS query is the most common usage of any
mobile user. Users query for nearby restaurants, the distance between their position and
another place, and so on. A typical example of such a service is: Alice would like to query
for nearby restaurants. For such queries, all we need is the exact location but not the user
profile information. If the user and his location are identified by the attacker who can snoop
the network, then important information can be leaked. For example, Alice visits a cancer
hospital regularly and goes to a pharmacy at a particular location every time she visits the
hospital. Imagine she has enabled LBS to any of her online social networking applications.
Then, the attacker can infer that Alice or a family member of hers has cancer, and also they
live in the neighborhood of the pharmacy she visits. This is a piece of crucial information
that should not be leaked.
While mobile users enjoy LBS, they have to provide their real locations to the LSP,
which poses a severe threat to their privacy. It is to be observed that the users might not
always want to reveal their location information to others. The key to addressing these
concerns lies in preserving the users’ privacy when efficiently providing correct query results.
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However, some LBS does consider user profile. For example, if a person searches for
a nearby restaurant, the result contains all the restaurants in the current area but sorted
according to the user history or interest. If the user preference is Asian cuisine, then the
results are sorted accordingly, and so on. Hence, accurate results for LBS is only possible if
we have exact location information and correct user profile. However, if we provide those to
the LBs query, the user’s privacy is not maintained.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the report is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the network model.
Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature in the context of privacy in social networks. Chapter
4 investigates the problem of user privacy while a social network is published online. Chapter
5 discusses the problems and proposed solutions for user location privacy in mobile social
networks. Chapter 6 introduces future research directions for this work.
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CHAPTER 2
NETWORK MODEL
Let us describe the social network pictorially (Figure 2.1) to understand its properties
and thereby formalizing its definition. We know that a social network is mainly comprised
of people. As a manner of speaking, a user can be a person, business, or a group of people
(Community). Let us assume everything is a user.
Figure 2.1. Social network with various users and shared attributes
Again, a profile can consist of various things according to the social network. For
example, on Facebook, a profile of a user can contain the following things:
• Personal Information (DoB, Area of living, School/college attended, work info, and so
on)
• Pictures
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• Tags (Places visited, restaurants, and movies)
Another social network, like ResearchGate, contains completely different profile infor-
mation. It might look like:
• Educational background
• Current position (Student, professor, and research candidate)
• His/her publications
• Contributions to the research community
All these profile information can be considered as “attributes”. Many of these attributes
are shared. For example, an attribute like “Georgia State University” does not belong to
a single person. There will be a lot of students who might have attended this school, and
hence, such an attribute becomes shared among all such users. In conclusion, there are two
kinds of attributes:
1. Private
2. Shared
Finally, the main reason for the invention of a social network is to enable the connection
between people. Irrespective of the type of social network, we always have people to connect
to. These are called “Friendships” on Facebook, “Followers” on Instagram/Twitter, and
“Matches” on Tinder. Names apart, the functionality of these connections connects two
people and can be referred to as “links” in generic terms. However, these links are one
dimensional in some social networks. For example, on Twitter, a celebrity os followed by
two million people, but not all of them are followed back by the celebrity. In some networks
like Facebook, if two people are connected, they are friends. Hence, the links in a social
network are directed.
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Additionally, some social networks provide different kinds of relations between people.
For example, on Facebook, a user can have a mother, father, spouse, brother, sister, and
cousin. The user is more closely related to these users than his colleagues or collegemates.
Hence, it is also important to assign weights to these links to specify how close two persons
are connected. This gives us a real-world replica of a social network.
To understand this better, let us reconstruct the social network problem as a graph-
based problem. Any social network can be represented as a graph, where each user’s profile
is a node, and friendship between two users is an edge between those two nodes. Each user
has attributes associated with him/her. Figure 2.2 shows a generalized social network graph
with nodes (users), attributes, and links between them.
Figure 2.2. Social network considered for this research
Let us assume we have a social network graph G = (V,E) where V represents the users
and E represents the edges between them. V = {u1, u2, u3, . . . ., un} and |V | = n. Every
user ui has a attributes set A values associated with it {ai1, ai2, ..., aim}. Edges are directed
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and hence are represented as: E = {e12, e21, e13, . . . ., en,n−1} and |E| = n ∗ (n− 1). Here, an
edge e12 represents an edge from vertex 1 to vertex 2, which is not same as e21, an edge from
vertex 2 to vertex 1. Additionally, every edge has a corresponding weight.
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CHAPTER 3
EMPERICAL ANALYSIS OF USER PRIVACY IN SOCIAL
NETWORKS
3.1 Privacy conditions
To understand the definition of privacy, we need to analyze three popular anonymity
definitions.
3.1.1 k-anonymity
K-anonymity was well studied by various authors in [13] [14] [15]. According to them,
a graph is k-degree anonymous if, for every node v, there exist at least k − 1 other nodes in
the graph with the same degree as v. This helps to anonymize the graph while preserving its
utility. In this method, anonymization is achieved by simply adding the edges to the existing
graph. That is, k-anonymity consists of two steps: first constructing a new degree sequence,
d′, that is k-anonymous; secondly, construct a new graph with this new degree sequence.
The running time of this method is O(nk). It is also to be observed that no anonymized
graph should be of the size larger than 2k − 1.
According to [13], k-anonymity method is implemented in the following way. First, we
construct a new graph from the obtained new degree sequence by starting with the highest
degree vertex. In the subsequent iterations, we always consider the highest remaining degree
vertex available for that iteration.
K-anonymity is simple and efficient but suffers from its various drawbacks. One of the
significant drawbacks is that it is vulnerable to attribute disclosure. Numerous researchers
have worked on this drawback to improvise the algorithm, e.g., [16] [17]. Two other notable
attacks were identified in [18]: homogeneity and the background knowledge attack.
12
3.1.2 l-diversity
According to [18], “An equivalence class is said to have l-diversity if there are at least
l “well-represented” values for the sensitive attribute.” In this method, the term “well-
represented” can be interpreted in many ways. In this paper, authors have used entropy as
the information-theoretic notion, and hence came the concept of Entropy l-diversity.
Entropy l-diversity. The entropy of an equivalence class E is defined to be
Entropy(E) = -
∑
s∈S p(E, s)logp(E, s)
Where S is the set of sensitive attributes, and p(E, s) is the fraction of records in E
that have sensitive value s. If the set S is divided into two sub-blocks Sa and Sb, then
Entropy(S) ≥ min(Entropy(Sa), Entropy(Sb)). To achieve l-diversity, we need to maintain
an entropy of at least log(l) for the entire table. One of the exceptions for this scenario is
when the sensitive attribute is very common, and hence this method is restrictive.
While l-diversity is advantageous over k-anonymity, it still has drawbacks. Primarily,
this method is complicated and may not be necessary to achieve [19]. Also, l-diversity is
not sufficient to ensure the prevention of attribute disclosure. It is prone to skewness and
similarity attacks. Authors of [17] have observed that the l-diversity, an improvement over
K-anonymity, still cannot restrain attribute disclosure when the table contains multiple
records of an individual. They proposed to have each specify privacy policies about his or
her attributes.
3.1.3 t-closeness
Although k-anonymity and l-diversity define the necessary conditions for privacy preser-
vation, they are insufficient. Both of these methods suffer from drawbacks. K-Anonymity
is vulnerable to attribute disclosure; whereas, l-diversity needs at least ‘l’ well-represented
values for each sensitive attribute. According to [19], “l-diversity is neither necessary nor
sufficient to prevent attribute disclosure”. Hence, a new technique is proposed in [19], called
“T -closeness”, to improve the performance by adding a constraint to l-diversity. According to
this constraint, it is essential to maintain the distribution of a sensitive attribute comparable
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to the distribution of its overall table. Specifically, the difference between the distributions
in an equivalence class and the entire table for a given sensitive attribute should not be more
than a given threshold. This additional constraint helps in preventing similarity attacks. To
calculate the distance, authors of [19] have chosen to use the earth mover distance measure.
Privacy in online social networks has been a prominent research topic ever since they
were introduced. However, the representation of OSNs has always been an issue. It was
until [20] that social networks have not been represented in terms of graphs. As explained in
the previous section, we consider a version of the social network, where there are three major
components: Nodes, Edges, and Attributes. All the previous related work had concentrated
on achieving privacy through one or more of these components. Hence, we are discussing
some of how these individual components privacy is achieved and their problems. The survey
about all the existing privacy-preserving mechanisms in an OSN has been discussed in detail
in [21].
3.2 Node privacy
Nodes in a social graph represent the user. Additionally, if a user is considered a node, it
means that none of his attributes defining the node are not considered. Hence, in this kind of
privacy mechanism, we intend to preserve the privacy of just a user, not concentrating on his
attributes. So, the only way a user’s identity is preserved without considering his attributes is
anonymization. Anonymization is a way of hiding information. One of the earliest techniques
of preserving node privacy is the Naive anonymization [22]. In this technique, we try to
replace each user with an id. That is, either a number or an alphabet [23]. For example, if
there are three users in the network: Alice, Bob, and Cathy. Now, the naive anonymization
technique replaces their name with some IDs. That is, Alice→ “A”, Bob→ “B”, and Cathy
→ “C”. Hence, to identify them back, we need to maintain an ID table containing users and
their corresponding ids.
However, it is clear from Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, that is the ID table is compromised;
then, the privacy is lost. Similarly, by observing the original and anonymized social networks,
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Name ID
Alice A
Bob B
Cathy C
Figure 3.1. Naive node anonymization:
Original social network
Figure 3.2. Naive node anonymization:
Anonymized social network
the graph is the same. So, it is easy to identify the meta-information from the graph. For
example, in networks like Facebook, it is easy to retrieve information of “Friends of Friends”
if the profiles are made public. This type of crawling may lead to the discovery of a complete
or partial network, leading to the development of the network structure locally [24]. Hence,
we move on to the next anonymization technique called “Random Walk Anonymization”.
A similar technique has also been applied to edge anonymization. The idea behind this
technique is to remove information randomly to preserve privacy randomly. In random walk
node anonymization, we start with a random node and walk for random steps in a given
direction. The node that the walk ends in will be removed. The process should be continued
until the desired privacy is achieved. Figure 3.3 shows the original graph before the random
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walk, and Figure 3.4 shows the anonymized graph after the random walk has been applied
to the nodes.
Figure 3.3. Random walk on nodes: Original
social network
Figure 3.4. Random walk on nodes:
Anonymized social network
Again, the subgraph information is evident in this kind of anonymization. Using attacks
like “Infiltration”, where an attacker is part of the network, and he knows who he is or his
neighbors are. From the anonymized graph, it is easier to find out if his information is
deleted. If it is deleted, he can reverse engineer the anonymization technique. If not, he
can be able to retrieve information about more users in the network. Hence, this kind of
anonymization also fails.
Another way of achieving anonymization is through “Perturbation”. This is similar to
a random walk technique, but instead of walking a distance, we find a random node and
delete it. In this technique, we either delete a node or add a new dummy node, thereby
increasing the randomness. However, according to [22], if the randomness is increased by
more than 10%, it is hard to retrieve the information lost, and hence we have high information
loss. Authors in [25] have enhanced the traditional k-anonymity and l-diversity methods to
anonymize the social networks using both node and link perturbations. In the k-anonymity
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method proposed by [25], we anonymize the vertices using a technique called “neighborhood
component coding”. In this method, vertices are greedily classified into ‘n’ similar groups,
and the vertices in the same category are replaced with the same label. Following the power-
law distribution, this method starts by finding the highest degree vertex. This technique is
improvised in [26], which suggests that the graphs should be isomorphic. Similarly, authors in
[25] have proposed that to achieve l-diversity, we need to divide all the nodes into equivalence
groups. Previous studies have revealed that the background information of an adversary may
also lead to the discovery of vertex degrees in a given network [22] [27] [28] [29], node pair
similarities [30] [31], and link types [32] [33] [34] [35] [36]. An attack, called the walk-based
attack, had been proposed in [37] to understand the connection between any two given
nodes. In this method, an attacker creates k different accounts and links them randomly in
the network. He then creates a specific link pattern with the nodes of interest. Once the
adversary establishes these connections, it is easy to identify the sub-graph of the nodes, in
the anonymized graph, that corresponds to his accounts with a high probability.
We now come to a better way of achieving anonymization, that is, grouping or clustering.
In this technique, we try to group a certain number of users/nodes and form a single node.
The most prominent information in a social network is the location. Hence, we group users
based on their location information. For example, all the users in the same building can
be grouped. All the users living in the same city can be grouped. However, there will be
information loss if we group more people together. Hence, authors in [38] have adopted
the k-anonymity principle while grouping people. Hence, we only need to group ‘k’ people
in order to achieve k-anonymity. Various techniques talk about grouping users. In spatial
cloaking mechanism [39], authors have proposed a method where every user searches for ‘k’
neighbors in a given radius ‘r’. Once he identifies the circle in which the users exist, he then
uses the circle’s information rather than his own. Another way is grid-based cloaking [40],
where the server divides the entire location into various grids such that every grid has at
least ‘k’ users. In the prior technique, there is a computation overhead on the user while
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in the latter, at the server. However, the essential information is that the metadata is still
susceptible to attacks, and also there will be colossal information loss.
In conclusion, whenever an anonymization technique is proposed, we lose information
and gain privacy. As both are inversely proportional to each other, we have to identify
specific quantities that can determine a user’s privacy level. According to [22], we have to
measure the following quantities when a node anonymization technique is proposed.
• Closeness Centrality: This is the average shortest path from one node to all the nodes
in the graph.
• Betweenness Centrality: This is the proportion of all shortest paths through a given
node.
• Path Length Distribution: This is constructed from all the shortest paths between each
pair of nodes.
• Degree Distribution: This is the distribution of all the vertices degrees
• Diameter: This is the maximum shortest path between any two given nodes.
All these quantities ensure that the properties of the graph are preserved while preserv-
ing user privacy.
3.3 Link privacy
The next component of privacy that we are discussing is the link/edge privacy. Edges
represent the friendship between two users. According to various social networks, these edges
can be assumed to be non-directional, one-directional, or bi-directional. However, the ma-
jority of the earlier works assumed these edges to be non-directional for simplicity purposes.
Also, extending the techniques to bi-directional is complicated and time-consuming.
One of the earliest techniques proposed in edge privacy is “Perturbation” [41], [42]. This
is similar to the perturbation technique in node privacy. We randomly select certain edges
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and delete them. Additionally, we can choose two nodes randomly with no link between
them and insert an edge. This technique aims to anonymize the edges by changing the
graph structure. This method can be seen in figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.5. Edge perturbation: Original
social network
Figure 3.6. Edge perturbation: Anonymized
social network
Similar to perturbation, a random walk can also be applied to edge privacy. In this
technique, we start with a node and walk for a random number of steps in a direction. The
final edge in this walk can be removed as a part of the privacy-preserving process. For
example, let us assume that we have randomly selected vertex ‘u’ as the source node. Then,
out of all the neighbors of vertex ‘u’, one neighbor is selected to continue the walk, say ‘v’,
and parallelly we increment the path length by ‘1’. We continue the process of random walk
till the desired length ‘l’ is obtained. However, this technique can be compromised by simple
perturbation attacks. According to [43], a simple perturbation to a random walk technique
is to introduce a new edge at the end of the existing path with a length ‘l−1’. Let us assume
that there is a path ‘a− b− c− d’, then the perturbation of node ‘z’ is done by adding it to
the path ‘a− b− c− d− z’. In this case, we face two problems:
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• Random walk path could be completed at node ‘d’ or
• Node ‘z’ is already on the path
To eliminate both the problems which might lead to self-loops or duplicate edges, we
perform the random walk process until a suitable path is found. To maintain the utility of
the graph, an application parameter l is maintained. This parameter can be used to control
the random walk (l-hop random walk).
The major problem with perturbation is information loss. If the information loss exceeds
more than a certain amount, then the anonymized graph is not useful. If it does not remove
more information, it is easier for the background knowledge attacks to retrieve information.
In this kind of attack, an attacker has certain background information. For example, he
might be a part of the network (“infiltration”) or know certain people in the network. This
makes it easier for the attacker to identify patterns in the anonymized graph and retrieve
information. Combining both node and edge anonymization through perturbation can also
be compromised using background knowledge attack []. Thus, this kind of anonymization
no longer provides the desired privacy.
Unlike node grouping, it is not simple to group edges as they do not have attributes.
However, if the groups/clusters of users are formed, then the edges inside the cluster can be
removed, and only edges between clusters can be maintained. We have shown how a simple
edge grouping algorithm modifies the original network from Figure 3.7 into an anonymized
(grouped) network in Figure 3.8.
In conclusion, we can anonymize the edges at various generalization levels [36]:
• Intact edges: This technique removes sensitive edges leaving all the other edges intact
• Partial-edge removal: This technique removes a certain percentage of observations
based on a pre-specified criterion. For example, removing edges that connects high
degree nodes at random.
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Figure 3.7. Original social network Figure 3.8. Anonymized social network
• Cluster-edge anonymization: In this method, we form clusters of different edge types
and make sure the number of edges between these clusters remains the same, even after
removing and adding random edges.
• Cluster-edge anonymization with constraints: This technique is an extension of the
previous technique. Here, we assume additional constraints, like any two equivalence
classes, should have some limitations to the corresponding nodes in the original graph.
• Removed edges: This technique removes all edges.
3.4 Attribute privacy
Most of the related work in this area focuses mainly on the location attribute of a user.
Although a social network user has many attributes, one of his prime concerns will be to
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hide his exact location details. Hence, preserving the user’s location privacy has become a
much-studied research area in this graph element privacy.
A user generally reveals his location information only when he searches for something
that requires providing his location privacy. Hence, Location Based Services (LBS) is where
user location privacy is much studied. Again, to achieve this, various researchers have
proposed various techniques. One of the earliest techniques is to change the granularity of
the location. For example, if a user is on the street ABC, Area A, City C. Then, instead of
providing street ABC as the location, we provide Area A. Again, k-anonymity principle is
widely used to determine the generalization of location granularity.
Another technique is to provide dummy locations and re-calculating the distance. Au-
thors in [44] have utilized the spatial cloaking mechanism to change the location information.
This protocol is based on the distributed model that computes a cloak area which covers
all collaborative peers to satisfy the spatial k-anonymity. This approach is different from
existing methods as it does not rely on any intermediate anonymizer; any collaborative user
does not have to trust each other. It possesses stronger robustness in the scenarios with
multiple initiators and the scenarios with a collision. First, a mobile user initiates the LBS,
searching k − 1 companions and collaborating to form a cloak area, which covers k peers
according to a certain degree of k-anonymity and these peers exchange information through
an ad-hoc network. The initiator randomly selects a peer in the group as an agent who sends
query messages with location information on behalf of the initiator to the LBS server. Upon
this request, the LBS server seeks the desired information in the database and returns appro-
priate answers to the initiator through the agent. Finally, the initiator selects a satisfactory
solution.
Another algorithm is a grid-based cloaking mechanism proposed by [45]. This algo-
rithm supports both k-anonymity and l-diversity. In this algorithm, a minimum grid area
is obtained for every user. For every user, we start by expanding the area until we find ‘k’
users (k-anonymity) with ‘l’ different attributes (l-diversity). This helps in reducing any
unnecessary computations. This cloaking algorithm creates a temporary cloaking area by
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expanding its region. Starting at a two-dimensional coordinate system where the user is
currently residing, it expands in the shape of a hexagon by one unit at a time. Once a step
of expansion is made, the algorithm compares the ‘k’ and ‘l’ values. If anyone of the values
does not match, then the expansion step continues. The algorithm comes to a termination
point, once it finds the desired area. To efficiently perform this algorithm, a grid structure is
used for storing the user location information. A post pruning technique is used to eliminate
any unnecessary region expansion. Since the k-value is higher than l-value, there is a high
probability that if we find k-users, we tend to obtain the l-value. Thus it helps to create the
minimum cloaking region more efficiently. A grid structure is maintained to store buildings
and users. All the anonymization techniques proposed previously have been summarized
in [21] [46] [47].
This concludes the various privacy-preserving schemes for a graph-based social network.
There are specific techniques, in which authors have suggested using completely different
networks that are constructed based on privacy as the primary principle. These alternate
systems are discussed in the following section.
3.5 Alternate systems
SPROUT Social Path ROUTing (SPROUT) is an alternate routing path proposed
for communication between friends in a network [48]. It mainly concentrates on the reduc-
tion of communication costs between two active nodes in the system. In this method, the
communication between nodes follows a peer-to-peer network, and hence there is no server.
This technique adopts the CHORD protocol for the communication and thus introduces a
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) to store all the friends’ id values. According to SPROUT,
when a user initially joins the network, it is assigned a random network identifier that lies
in the range [0,1]. As the user forms friends and the node generates neighbors, they are
assigned identifier numbers that are sequential to the user. This subsequent assignment of id
values forms an id number ring. To reduce the communication delay between users, we also
generate links halfway around the ring, quarter way, one-eighth way, and so on. Hence the
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maximum communication delay between any two users in the network is O(logn). The DHT
stores the hash value of the neighbor’s id keys, which is on the best route to reach every
user. This helps us while communicating with online friends. The overall communication
between two users ‘u’ and ‘v’ can be summarized into the following steps:
1. Find a neighbor of ‘u’ whose id value is close to ‘v’ but not greater than logn.
2. If a neighbor ‘n’ is found, the message is forwarded to ‘n’ and continue to find a
neighbor of ‘n’ that is best reachable to ‘v’.
3. If no such neighbor is found, then forward the message to the neighbor whose id value
is the id value of ‘n’ + 1. Thus, the message goes to every node in the ring until the
desired node ‘v’ is obtained.
Lockr is a system that can be integrated with any of the existing social networks [49].
It works well in both centralized and peer-to-peer network as the Lockr system is independent
of the underlying network technology. The main aim of Lockr is to provide security to the
users. It primarily concentrates on providing three security benefits: private communication
between users, authenticating the users, and providing right access controls. To provide
these benefits, Lockr has proposed the following techniques:
1. Personal Identities and Address Books: Each user in the network maintains a
public/private key pair that can be used for communication. Each user is also entitled
to manage the address book that contains information about friends and their public
keys.
2. Social Attestation: This attestation acts like a certificate between two users con-
firming their friendship status. It includes information about the two users, type of
friendship between them, and most importantly, a “friendship key”. It is to be noted
that two users can have more than one attestation/relation. For example, two people
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who studied at the same university can now be co-workers. In this situation, we main-
tain two social attestations, but the attestation that has been issued for classmates has
been expired.
3. Social Access Control Lists (ACLs): Every user also maintains an ACL that
stores information about the content access to different friends. For example, a user
can restrict personal information like movies he watched and places he visited from his
employer.
Lockr provides the users with a complete choice of what technique to use and where
to store the data. Since all the profile information is not public, it should be stored in a
third-party database. Hence, users can choose which database to use. Once the information
is decoupled from the social network, Lockr provides additional functionalities like creating
the public/private key pair, ACLs, and so on. Additionally, Lockr also provides mechanisms
to deal with expired attestations and revoking them if necessary. If attestation is expired,
Lockr uses one-way hashing to protect them from being abused by non-authorized users.
Pisces is a system that has also been proposed for secure communication in the online
social network [43]. It is a peer-to-peer network that uses onion routing for anonymous
communication. Every node in the Pisces architecture generates a public/private key pair.
They discover peers by using random walks. One of the major drawbacks of this technique
is that it is vulnerable to route capture attacks. To address this issue, Pisces proposes
“Reciprocal Neighbor Policy”. According to this policy, we associate the routing table of
each node with its neighbors. For example, if a Sybil node advertises itself as an honest
node, all of its neighboring benign nodes exclude the Sybil node from their routing tables.
To ensure the security of the proposed policy, there is a periodic check on every node’s
neighborhood list. Four other features are associated with this policy.
1. Liveness Check: Every node checks with its benign neighbor nodes if they are alive
are reciprocating the trust.
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2. Degree Exchange: Every node should broadcast the degree, the number of nodes in
the neighborhood list, periodically to all the neighbors.
3. Final List: Upon receiving the degree information, each node finalizes its neighbor-
hood list and encrypts with its private key.
4. Local Integrity Check: Every node in the network saves the signed versions of the
neighborhood lists from all the neighboring nodes.
Safebook is a distributed online social network intended to preserve privacy based on
real-life trust [50]. It is a de-centralized OSN (DOSN) developed to issue the problems
of privacy, integrity, and availability. Safebook is a three-tier architecture. Every user in
Safebook is considered a host node connected to all the peers through the P2P overlay. There
are two types of overlays:
• A set of matryoshkas which are the structures in network-level that provides com-
munication privacy.
• P2P substrate giving lookup services.
Matryoshkas are designed to provide trusted data storage and retrieval. It also uses
indirection technique to communicate anonymously. The set of nodes in Matryoshkas are
arranged in concentric rings, and all messages have to relay through all the rings. Since
the immediate rings in the concentric circles are based on actual trust between the nodes,
we assume that the information passage is secure and private. The innermost ring consists
of various nodes that are in direct communication with the core. These nodes store all of
the core’s data in encrypted form and are mirrored among all the nodes. In contrast to the
innermost ring, the outermost ring acts as a gateway to the core. The second overlay, which
is P2P, is mainly used to provide location service for outside nodes to find the entry point
of a user’s matryoshkas. We also have a trusted identification server (TIS) that maintains a
relation to node identifier and its pseudonym.
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Supernova ia an alternative DOSN that was proposed to solve the issue of privacy and
autonomy was proposed in [51] called “Supernova”. It is a super-peer based architecture
where incentives are provided to peers to help facilitate new node joins in the system. In this
architecture, we save a node’s data at multiple nodes, which are either friends or strangers
suggested by super-peers. We have three types of nodes in this architecture: user profiles,
friends list, storekeeper, and super-peers. Storekeepers of user ‘n’ are a list of nodes that
have agreed to store the user’s data‘ n’ just to replicate the information. Super-peer is
a special status given to any node if it provides its services to the system. These services
include agreeing to store information of a new node who initially does not have many friends,
maintains, and manages various services.
When we add a new node to the network, it has to go through several phases. The
initial phase is when a user joins and store all his information. He will be informed of the
amount of space given to him, how long he can save the information, what kind of data can
be saved, and what kind of advertisements will be given to him. Once he agrees to all the
terms and selects his super-peer, he enters into the next phase called “Take care phase”. In
this phase, the user tries to establish friendship in the system. Super-peer will keep track
of new nodes up-down time and ask other stranger nodes to replicate the user data. Once
this is finished, the user enters the final stage called “Settled phase” where he is settled and
no longer requires a super-peer. Every update or change he does will be updated to all the
storekeepers available at that time. If they are not available, they will be updated once they
become available.
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CHAPTER 4
USER PRIVACY IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS BASED
ON ANONYMIZATION
4.1 Problem definition
We represent the social network in the form of a graph. The graph representation of the
problem has already been discussed in Chapter 2. Let us assume a social network with ‘n’
users, and each user has ‘a’ attributes. The set A = {a1, a2, ...an} are the set of all possible
attributes that a user can have. If a user does not have attributes a3 set, we assume it as
NULL. Hence, all the attributes are initially set to NULL.
The friendships between the two users are directional. That is, if ‘A’ follows ‘B’, we
represent an edge: A→ B. If ‘A’ is a friend of ‘B’, we represent an edge A↔ B. Hence, all
the edges are directional.
To define a social network formally, let us assume a graph G with ‘n’ vertices and edges
between those vertices are represented by a set E. For example, if there is an edge between
user 1 and user 2, then we form an edge e12. Hence, G = (V,E) is our social network where
‘V ’ is the vertices/users and ‘E’ is the edges/links. As discussed previously, vertices represent
the users and hence V = u1, u2, ..., un is a set of users. Hence, |V | = n and the maximum
number of edges possible between ‘n’ users are n × (n − 1). Therefore, |E| = n × (n − 1)
are the maximum number of edges. Also, each edge has a corresponding weight associated
with it. This weight represents the closeness relation between two users. For example, if
user 1 and user 2 are mother and daughter while user 2 and user 3 are colleagues. Then,
there should be a way of representing that user 1 and user 2 are close. Hence, we chose a
weight value of w ∈ (0, 1), where 0 represents no relation at all, and hence 0 is not included.
Similarly, 1 represents the self, and hence, 1 is also not included as there are no self-loops.
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A weight for edge e12 is represented by w12. Hence, maximum number of values possible for
W = {w12, w13, ...., wn(n−1)} is also n× (n− 1).
4.2 Privacy definition
4.2.1 Proposed privacy definition
This paper aims to anonymize graph G such that the anonymized graph G′ = (V ′, E ′)
with anonymized vertex set V ′, anonymized edge set E ′, and anonymized attribute set A′
following objectives:
• Given a constant k, for each node ‘u’, the probability that an attacker re-identifies u
is at most 1
k
.
• Given a constant l, the probability that an attacker re-identifies u if one of the attributes
is known is at most 1
l
.
• Minimize information loss while maximizing the degree of anonymity.
4.3 Privacy through anonymization
It is a common practice to publish data to a trusted third party, and due to such
publication, often privacy leaks happen [52]. Researchers have identified two types of attacks:
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure attacks [53] [54] [19]. Identity disclosure is a type
of attack where the attacker tries to match an anonymized individual with a known user in the
database. Attribute disclosure is a type of attack where the attacker tries to infer unknown
or hidden attributes of the user based on the publicly available information. Although a
complete identity disclosure is not possible, identifying hidden attributes is very high.
Based on the privacy laws, all the social network administrators need to sanitize the
data before it is published. However, data sanitization or data anonymization is a complex
problem and have no way of quantifying. Hence, we need to understand the usage of such
data publication and anonymize it so that the user’s privacy is maintained and the utility of
29
data. One of the naive methods to anonymize user data is to remove “Personally Identifiable
Information”, also known as the PII. This PII is a single attribute such as SSN or a group of
attributes such as names, user name, age, and location information. This solution is far from
sufficient in preserving privacy [37] [55]. We have discussed a variety of these anonymization
techniques in chapter 3.
4.4 Clustering for anonymization
The Enhanced-Equicardinal clustering method to achieve user anonymization is pro-
posed in [56]. A simple clustering method ensures that there is no more individual infor-
mation that can be retrieved from the anonymized network. This mechanism ensures both
vertex and edge anonymization without loss of much information. All similar users can be
grouped into a single cluster. For example, all the Ph.D. students from the computer science
department in a given city can be grouped. This ensures that the common (non-sensitive)
attributes of all such users are now represented with a single cluster head. Assume a scenario
where a user’s profile is nothing but their location information that is their current address.
For example, <Bob, Apt 1234, 123 Main St, Bay Area, California, USA>. If the user uses
this information for any Location-Based Service (LBS) query, his address can be retrieved by
an attacker. However, by using the proposed method, we find ‘k users of the social network
whose geographical locations are close. Assume all of them live in the Bay Area, but might
be on different streets and different apartments. The generalized profile now would be <1,
Bay Area, California, USA>. Using this generalized profile, the user asks for an LBS query.
So, even if the attacker retrieves this information, there are ‘k’ other users living in the same
area, and also the exact address is still protected for all the users. However, the results might
vary, that is, the utility drops. Hence, we aim to preserve the utility and provide the highest
obfuscation. However, it is to be noted that a simple clustering method will not ensure that
all the clusters are of equal size. This is to ensure that there are no information leaks due
to the difference in anonymization between users. Hence, we enhance a simple clustering
algorithm like k-means to ensure that every cluster contains a minimum of ‘k’ users. This,
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in turn, also ensures that each user cannot be distinguished from ‘k − 1’ similar users and
hence guarantees k-anonymity.
As a method of clustering data, the k-means algorithm is widely used because of its
simplicity and ability to converge extremely quickly in practice. In [27], Hay et al. applied
structural generalization approaches that groups nodes into clusters, by which privacy details
about individuals can be appropriately hidden.
The proposed method aims to cluster users whose profiles are similar. For example,
two students studying at University A should be grouped than two students studying in
different universities. k-means clustering is one such method that groups users based on
their closeness. The main advantage of k-means is that it is fast and produces tighter
clusters. k-medoids algorithm, a similar yet powerful technique, is an alternative to a k-
means algorithm where we need to reduce the sum of squared distances (SSD) between
cluster points and their corresponding cluster heads. Although k-medoids give us a smaller
SSD value than k-means, it will not provide us better privacy in our scenario. This is because
k-medoids is calculated based on the principle that a medoid is calculated for a cluster rather
than mean. A medoid is one of the data points in a cluster. In our scenario, data points
represent the user’s profile. So, selecting a medoid as the cluster head indicates that we are
choosing one of the user’s profiles as the cluster head. Thus, we are exposing the exact user’s
attribute values. However, the main aim of this paper is precisely the opposite. Additionally,
since the k-values are not large, a simple brute force attack will reveal the exact user to which
this profile is linked.
Let us understand this in detail with the help of an example scenario. Assume that the
user’s profile only contains locations which are the exact addresses of where that user lives
like Apt 1234, 123 Main street, Area, City, Country, Zip code. Now, if we select a medoid,
this exact address would be chosen as a cluster head and all the users in that cluster has
the same address. If users are searching for a Location Based Query (LBS), like nearby
restaurants, they do not want to reveal a specific address. Instead, it would be much helpful
if the query searches for restaurants near the area, which is achieved by k-means.
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Also, if k-medoids is used, an attacker knows that out of ‘k’ users, one of them resides
at that exact location. So, with the help of other profile information like gender and occu-
pation, he can identify the person. This is possible because none of the profile attributes are
anonymized. For example, there are four users in a cluster: Alice, Bob, Cathy, Danny. By
using k-medoids, we generate a profile:
<Male, Ph.D. student, room no: 1234, Building 123, Main street, Atlanta>
Let us assume that the attacker has the background knowledge that Bob resides in
Atlanta, and he is a Ph.D. student. Now, using this information, he can identify that the
cluster head is indeed Bob’s profile, and the attacker now knows Bob’s exact address. To
avoid such circumstances and knowledge attacks, we propose using k-means clustering where
no cluster head’s profile is the same as any user’s profile. Instead, it generalizes, and the
knowledge-based attacks are not possible. Another issue with k-means is its tolerance to
outliers. We have used a k-means algorithm to consider outliers as a part of our system. In
the problem statement, we have mentioned that the network we use contains user’s profiles
that have been scanned for any possible Sybil users. As there will not be any Sybil users in
the system, all the users are genuine users of the social network. Hence, we need to provide
the same privacy level to everyone. If we use a clustering technique that leaves out outliers,
it means we are leaving out users just because they live in a remote area, or their likes and
dislikes are different from other users. However, in fact, such users require more privacy
than the rest, and the attacker who identifies that a user lives in a far area can be vulnerable
to theft. Hence, using k-means avoid ignoring outliers and provide similar privacy for all of
them.
Another advantage with k-means is its tolerance to outliers. We have used a k-means
algorithm to consider outliers as a part of our system. In the problem statement, we have
mentioned that the network we use contains user’s profiles that have been scanned for any
possible Sybil users. As there will not be any Sybil users in the system, all the users are
genuine users of the social network. Hence, we need to provide the same privacy level to
everyone. If we use a clustering technique that leaves out outliers, it means we are leaving
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out users just because they live in a far area, or their likes and dislikes are different from
other users. But in fact, such users require more privacy than the rest, and the attacker who
identifies that a user lives in a far area can be vulnerable for theft. Hence, using k-means
avoid ignoring outliers and provide similar privacy for all of them.
Hence, we use k-means clustering to cluster the users. We use the user’s profile (at-
tributes of the user) to calculate the distance between two users. Let us assume, user vector
−→
|ui| represents all the attributes associated with user ui and let ‘R’ is the number of at-
tributes. Similarly, let
−→
|ui| and
−→
|cj| be user ‘i’ and centroid ‘j’. Distance between them can
be calculated in an R-dimensional space as:
D2i,j = |Pi − Cj|2 =
R∑
n=1
(pi,n − cj,n)2 (4.1)
One problem by clustering the users using k-means clustering is that the resulting
clusters can be of uneven size. This is a significant problem in our scenario as not all users
are protected with the same level of privacy. Hence, we need clusters of equal size to ensure
the even privacy distribution overall users. Hence, to achieve overall k-anonymity, let us
construct a distance matrix in ascending order. Let DA represents this ascending ordered
distance array. The values in this array are described below:

Di1,j1
Di2,j2
Di3,j3
.
.
.
Dim,jm

(4.2)
The array DA is of size nk × 1. This method is explained in detail in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Calculate Distance Matrix
Input: N → Set of users, C → Set of cluster centroids, A → Set of attributes Output:
DA → Ordered distance matrix
For i = 1 to n
For j = 1 to k
D(ui, cj) =
Σa∈Adist(uia,cja)
|A|
endfor
endfor
m ← 1
For i = 1 to n
For j = 1 to k
DA(m, 1)← D(ui, cj)
DA(m, 2)← i
DA(m, 3)← j
m ← m+ 1
endfor
endfor
DA ← MergeSort(DA) based on first column
4.5 Termionology
4.5.1 Information loss
According to [57], information loss can be calculated as:
Information Loss(L) =
SSE
SST
(4.3)
where SSE is the error sum of squares (information loss with in group), and SST is the
total sum of squares (information loss between groups).
SSE =
k∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(xij − Cl)′(xij − Cl) (4.4)
where, k is the number of clusters, ni is the user n that belongs to cluster Ci, and Ci is the
average data vector over the whole set of users belonging to cluster Ci
Ci =
k∑
i=1
t2i
ni
− t
2
n
(4.5)
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where, ti is the total sum of users in cluster Ci, T is the grand total of all clusters, ni is the
user n that belongs to cluster Ci, and n is the total number of users
SST =
n∑
i=1
|C|∑
j=1
|xij − Cj| −
∑n
i=1 xij ×
∑|C|
j=1Cj
n× |C|
(4.6)
where, xij is the user xi belonging cluster Cj, |C| is the total number of clusters, and n is
the total number of users
4.5.2 Degree of anonymity
According to k-anonymity [58], a graph is k-anonymous if for every node ‘v’, there
exist at least k − 1 other nodes in the graph with the same degree as ‘v’. That is, user
degree is the same as the degree of its assigned cluster. There are b n
k−1c more users with
the same degree. Hence, we say that by assigning the users to clusters with the algorithm
mentioned Algorithm 2, we obtain an n
k
degree anonymous graph. We calculate Degree of
Anonymization as,
DA = Degree(Cui)× l (4.7)
4.6 Enhanced equi-cardinal clustering
In the proposed method, the main aim is to anonymize all the users in the network
in such a way that they cannot be distinguished among ‘k’ other users. To achieve this,
we should make sure that each user’s anonymity is greater than or equal to ‘k’. In our
method, we are achieving this anonymization using clustering. Also, ‘k’ is calculated based
on the best utility. That is, the value of ‘k’ is determined based on the number of users,
their attributes and the values of the attributes. The anonymization degree of user ui is the
number of users in the cluster that ui belongs to. To maintain k-anonymity, we should make
sure that each cluster has at least ‘k′ users. But let us assume that there are two clusters
C1 and C2. C1 has ‘k users and C2 has ‘l = 10 × k’ users. Then, all the users in C1 are
k-anonymous while users in C2 are l-anonymous. This difference in the anonymization level
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increases the probability of information leakage. Hence, to prevent any such information
leaks, we maintain equal anonymity levels to all the users. Therefore, we create clusters that
are of almost the same size that is equi-cardinal clustering.
To achieve equi-cardinal clustering, we rearrange the users into different clusters. The
primary aim of this method is to rearrange users into similar size clusters with minimal
increase in the information loss. Hence, we aim at removing users from the clusters which
contain more than dn
k
e users and place them in the next best cluster. However, we also have
to consider users who least belong in an existing cluster, thereby reducing the increase in
information loss.
To achieve this, let us start from the first element in the ascending ordered distance
array, Di1,j1 , and assign user ui1 to cluster Cj1 if it satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Size of cluster Cj1 should be less than or equal to dnk e;
2. User ui1 is not assigned
Since all the clusters should be of equal size, the maximum number of users allowed per
cluster is dn
k
e. If any user cannot be assigned, we ignore and forward it with the next
element in the array. This process is explained in the Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Equi-cardinal k-means Clustering
Input: N → Set of users, k → number of clusters, A → Set of attributes
Output: C → Culsters with assigned users
C ← k-meansClustering(N ,k)
DA ← CalculateDistance(N ,C,A)
assigned ← n× 1 zero matrix
C ← k × 1 array of empty lists
For each element m in DA:
u ← DA(m, 2)
c ← DA(m, 3)
If assigned(u) 6= 0 AND length(Cc) ≤ dnk e
Cc ← append u
assigned(u) ← 1
endif
endfor
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4.6.1 Achieving k-anonymity
Theorem 1: For each node u, the probability that an attacker re-identifies ‘u’ lies in
the range (bn/k2c, dn/ke).
Proof. Let us consider the initial graph or the un-anonymized graph G = (V,E) where V
is the user set, E is the edge set, and |v| = n. Let us assume the anonymized graph as
G′ = (K,E) where K is the number of clusters and E ′ is the modified edge set. Also,
according to the proposed algorithm, each cluster has at least bn/kc users. Let us assume
that the attacker has background knowledge of a user ui which means that |ui| is known.
From the anonymized graph G′, we know each cluster and its corresponding vector. Thus,
an attacker can identify the cluster a user belongs to with the following probability:
p =

1, if ui ∈ Cj
1
k
, otherwise
(4.8)
If an attacker correctly identifies the cluster, there are still bn/kc or dn/ke users in Cj
and hence the probability that the attacker identifies the right user is:
p =

(bn
k
c, dn
k
e), if ui ∈ Cj
( 1
k
bn
k
c, 1
k
dn
k
e), otherwise
(4.9)
Hence, the range can be guaranteed as ( 1
k
bn
k
c, dn
k
e) ≈ (b n
k2
c, dn
k
e).
Lemma 1: Objective 1 holds.
Proof. For a given constant ‘c’, choose the number of clusters ‘k’ in such a way that
1
c
≥ n
k2
(4.10)
This can be further reduced as:
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k = d
√
cne (4.11)
Theorem 2: For a given set of users (n) and defined number of clusters (k), the
minimum anonymity degree for any user ui in the network is:
D(ui) = n− (k − 1)× d
n
k
e (4.12)
Proof. According to the algorithm proposed, the distance between user ‘i’ and cluster cen-
troids are:
D(ui, ca) ≤ D(ui, cb) ≤ D(ui, cc) ≤ ...... ≤ D(ui, ck) (4.13)
By this equation, it is clear that user ui is the closest to cluster center ca and hence it
should be assigned to cluster ca. But, let us assume cluster ca already contains dnk e users.
Then, ui will be assigned to the next best option, that is cluster cb. So,
maximum number of users per cluster = dn
k
e (4.14)
Let us assume the worst-case scenario of the ordered distance matrix DA, that is all the
users are nearest to the single cluster centroid. Also, assume γ = dn
k
e. Then,

Di1,j1
Di2,j1
Di3,j1
.
.
.
Din,j1


Di1,j2
Di2,j2
Di3,j2
.
.
.
Din,j2

...

Di1,jk
Di2,jk
Di3,jk
.
.
.
Din,jk

(4.15)
38
According to the algorithm proposed,
users u1, u2, u3, . . . ., uγ will be assigned to cluster c1, users uγ+1, uγ+2, uγ+3, . . . ., u2γ will be
assigned to cluster c2, . . . . , and users u(n−1)(γ+1), u(n−1)(γ+2), u(n−1)(γ+3), . . . ., un will be
assigned to cluster ck.
So, clusters c1 to cn−1 have dnk e users. Remaining users belong to cluster ck. Total number
of users in c1 = dnk e Total number of users in c1 through ck−1 = (k− 1)d
n
k
e Remaining users
= n− (k − 1)dn
k
e according to [2],
n− (k − 1)dn
k
e ≤ kdn
k
e (4.16)
Hence, the lower bound on data anonymity is
D(ui) ≥ n− (k − 1)d
n
k
e (4.17)
4.6.2 Extending for l-diversity
The extension to the original algorithm is proposed in [59]. k-anonymity is efficient and
straightforward but suffers from its drawbacks. One of the significant disadvantages is that
it is vulnerable to attribute disclosure. Numerous researchers have worked on this drawback
to improvise the algorithm, e.g., [16] [17]. Two other notable attacks were identified in [18]:
homogeneity and the background knowledge attack.
According to [18], “An equivalence class is said to have l-diversity if there are at least
l “well-represented” values for the sensitive attribute.” In this method, the term “well-
represented” can be interpreted in many ways. In this paper, we use entropy as the
information-theoretic notion and employ the concept of Entropy l-diversity. We use this
metric to measure the diversity of each cluster.
Entropy(E) = −
∑
s∈S
p(E, s) logp(E, s) (4.18)
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where S is the set of sensitive attributes, and p(E, s) is the fraction of records in E
that have sensitive value s. If the set S is divided into two sub-blocks Sa and Sb, then
Entropy(S)≥min(Entropy(Sa), Entropy(Sb)). So, to achieve l-diversity, we need to main-
tain an entropy of at least log(l) for the entire table. This process of this enhancement is
explained in detail in Algorithm 3.
In this algorithm 3, we first compute the diversity of each cluster and save them in an
array called ‘D’. But any cluster which is at least l-diverse does not have to go through
the post-processing step. Hence, we remove such clusters from our processing algorithm.
The remaining clusters are then sent to the processing. Since this is a greedy algorithm, we
combine the most, and the least diverse clusters to verify the combined cluster is l-diverse.
Once we combine those two clusters, there are two outcomes: formed new cluster is ‘l’-diverse
or it is not. If it is l-diverse, it is removed from the processing step and continue with the
remaining clusters. If the new cluster still is not ‘l’-diverse, we now have new clusters in the
processing algorithm and continue with our step. We keep doing this until all the clusters
are at least ‘l’-diverse. In all of this process, since we are not removing any elements from
the cluster, our k-anonymity principle still holds for the newly formed clusters.
Algorithm 3 Post-process to ensure l-diversity
Input: C → Culsters ensuring k-anonymity, l → desired diversity
Output: C → Culsters ensuring k-anonymity and l-diversity
For each cluster c in C:
D[c] ← diversity of cluster ‘c’
endfor
remove all elements from D whose value ≥ l
While any value in D < l
H ← cluster with high diversity value
L ← cluster with least diversity value
M ← H + L
C ← C − {H,L}+M
endwhile
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4.6.3 Adding directions to edges
It is also important to observe that the information leak can happen through edges. By
observing how the nodes are connected in a graph, an attacker can gain insight on who that
node might be if related background information is provided [32] [38] [34] [36]. Hence, it
is imperative to conceal the link information between nodes. Our clustering technique will
group users with similarity. Now, all the users in a single group are represented by a single
cluster head. Hence, the edges between users belonging to two clusters can be modified into
super edges. Let us say there are two users u1 and u2 in cluster c1 and two users u3 and u4
in cluster c2. Our initial OSN contains edges between users u1 → u2, u1 → u3, and u2 → u4.
So, there are two edges between clusters c1 and c2 and one edge inside cluster c1. Since
we are clustering all the similar users into a single cluster, we ignore all the edges between
them. However, we have to focus on inter-cluster edges. Since there are two such edges, we
now have a super edge with weight 2. Also, to impede more information from the attacker,
we neutralize the weight by averaging with the number of users in both clusters. The final
super edge between clusters cm and cn can be calculated as:
ecm,cn =
∑
eucm ,ucn
|cm|+ |cn|
(4.19)
where, eucm ,ucn is an edge where one node of the edge belongs to user in cluster cm and the
other belongs to user in cluster cn. |ci| is the number of users in cluster ci.
4.6.4 Adding weights to edges
A real-world social network has edges that are weighted and directed. Many social
networks like Twitter, Instagram, and Reserchgate have a concept called followers and fol-
lowed. Every user has some followers, and he might be following other people. This concept
arises in need of direction for the edges. A celebrity with 1000 followers and following a
single person is different from a regular person who follows 1000 celebrities and is followed
by a single person. So, we give an outward-directed edge for the concept “follows” and an
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inward-directed edge for the concept “followed by”. In the previous example, the celebrity
has 100 inward-directed edges and one outward-directed edge while the regular person has
100 outward-directed edges and one inward-directed edge.
For such social networks, ignoring the direction of edges results in huge information loss.
Hence, we propose to maintain two different edges between clusters. There will be two edges
between any two given clusters having both outward-directed edge and inward-directed edge.
The edge weights of both the edges are calculated using the edge anonymization technique
discussed in Section 4.6.3. This process is explained in detail in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Edge anonymization for a weighted directed network
Input: C → Culsters ensuring k-anonymity and l-diversity, E → original edge set of all
users
Output: C → Culsters ensuring k-anonymity and l-diversity and are edge anonymized
For each cluster pair c, c′ in C:
n → number of users in cluster c
m → number of users in cluster c′
outward = 0
inward = 0
For each outward edge eout from c to c
′:
outward = outward + eout
endfor
For each inward edge ein in C from c to c
′:
inward = inward + ein
endfor
Outward edge weight from c to c′ → outward|m+n|
Inward edge weight from c to c′ → inward|m+n|
endfor
4.7 Computational analysis
Theorem 3: Dividing the nodes into ‘k’ clusters is a subset of Edge partitioning
problem for a number of users n ≥ 3 which is NP-complete
Proof. Given a graph G = (V ;E), our problem is to determine whether the edge-set E can
be partitioned into subsets E1, E2, ... in such a way that each Ei generates a subgraph of G
42
isomorphic to the complete graph Kn on n vertices. Our main result is that the problem EPn
is NP-complete for each n ≥ 3. From this, we can deduce that several other edge-partition
problems are NP-complete. To show that EPn is NP-complete, we can reduce our problem
to 3SAT problem, which is known to be NP-complete. A set of clauses C = {C1, C2, ..., Cr}
in variables u1, u2, ..., us is given, each clause Ci consisting of three literals li,1 , li,2 , li,3
where a literal li,j is either a variable uk or its negation uk. The problem is to determine
whether C is satisfiable, that is, whether there is a truth assignment to the variables which
simultaneously satisfies all the clauses in C. A clause is satisfied if exactly of its literals has
value “true”.
∑
j=1 to k
li,j = 1 (4.20)
Hence any final solution should contain exactly ‘k’ vertices and hence, it is an edge
partition problem, which is NP-complete.
Theorem 4: Computational complexity of the proposed algorithm for ‘n’ users with
‘d’ attributes divided into ‘k clusters is: O(n(d+ k)).
Proof. Equi cardinal k-means clustering, as proposed in Algorithm 2, combines two algo-
rithms and computation of its own.
1. k-means clustering: We refer [60] to compute clusters. This algorithm has a running
time of O(nd) with approximation ratio of (1+ε).
2. Calculation: This is proposed in Algorithm 1 which runs in O(nk) time.
3. Re-arranging clusters to form equal sized clusters: To re-arrange clusters, we
compare with the array DA which is of size n × k. Hence, comparing and assigning
each element in DA takes O(nk) time.
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Thus the total time complexity of the algorithm is:
= O(nd) +O(nk) +O(nk)
= O(nd) +O(nk)(asO(2nk) = O(nk))
= O(nd+ nk)
= O(n(d+ k))
4.8 Experimental results
The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm has been verified by utilizing two different
real-life datasets. The first dataset is the Yelp dataset [61]. The recent version of the dataset
was released in January 2018 and has been online for the Yelp challenge. Yelp dataset is
a customer review dataset where each user is connected with several other users and has
the user’s profile information. This dataset contains a total of 1.1 million users and their
reviews. We have focused on two files in this dataset, users, and friends. These two files
gave us information on user profiles/attributes and the connection/edge information between
users. There are a total of 18 attributes that include information about the user like the
number of reviews given, the number of user reviews, and average stars are given.
Another dataset that is used for our experiments is the Facebook dataset provided by
Stanford [62]. There are a total of 1 million users in this dataset and 25 attributes for
each user. User attributes include gender, country, language, and residence. Facebook is a
social network data. But unlike real-world social networks, we do not have many attributes
associated with each user. Hence, this dataset is also useful for understanding the behavior
of the proposed method.
We compare our proposed algorithms with three other algorithms. The first one is the
probability-based random obfuscation (PRO) introduced in [63]. In this method, random
obfuscation is achieved by perturbing graph G, randomly removing edges. However, the
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vertices are grouped if the edge has been removed. To generate a random number, the
Bernoulli trial has been used. This trial generates random probability values. If the proba-
bility is greater than 0.5, the edge will not be removed. If the probability is less than 0.5,
the edge is removed.
The second method is obfuscation by 2* neighborhood weighted grouping (NWG) as
introduced in [64] [65]. In this method, we start by randomly choosing a node. We parse
through all the 2-neighborhood nodes and obtain (k− 1) nodes whose weights are large. We
can extend this algorithm to any neighborhood.
The third method is a simple k-means clustering (KMC). In this method, we cluster
the users based on their profiles. These three methods are compared with our equi-cardinal
clustering (ECC) algorithm proposed in Section 4.6.1 and our final l-diversity enhanced equi-
cardinal clustering (LECC) for weighted and directed graphs proposed in Section 4.6.2, 4.6.3,
and 4.6.4.
All the experiments were conducted on Windows 10 operating system with Intel Core
(TM) Duo 2.66 GHz CPU,12 GB Memory, and Matlab 9.2 platform. Each observation has
been averaged over 50 instances. We have devised three different experimental metrics to
observe the performance of the proposed method. Each experiment considers the different
settings of users and attributes. Evaluation metrics are discussed in Section IV as a part of
the proposed method. Three metrics need to be observed in each experiment: Information
Loss (IL), Degree of Anonymization (DA), and Running Time (RT).
4.8.1 Effect of the number of clusters
Our first experiment’s goal is to observe the performance enhancement of equi-cardinal
clustering and enhanced l-diversity clustering when compared with the traditional clustering
algorithm. In this set of experiments, we ensure that both the datasets have an equal
number of users, which is 10,000 users. Although the number of attributes in both datasets
is different, we intend to observe the difference in the performance of all three algorithms.
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Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.3 shows the experimental results for the Yelp dataset. Similarly, Fig.
4.2 and Fig. 4.4 shows the experimental results for the Facebook dataset.
Figure 4.1. Information loss: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of clusters
for Yelp dataset
We can observe from Fig. 4.3 that the DA has been increased at least ten times for
equi-cardinal clustering and twenty times for l-diversity enhanced clustering. It can also be
observed that this increment in anonymization is maintained by maintaining the difference
in information loss to be less than 0.07% for equi-cardinal and 0.7% for enhanced l-diversity
clustering. Also, from Fig. 4.4, we can observe that the degree of anonymization for equi-
cardinal clustering has been increased by 50 times while the difference in information loss
is less than 4%. Similarly, from Fig. 4.4, we can observe that the anonymization has
increased at almost 100 times for enhanced l-diversity clustering. The difference between the
achieved degree of anonymization between Yelp and Facebook datasets is due to the number
of attributes in each dataset. Yelp dataset has 18 attributes, while the Facebook dataset
has 25 attributes. As there is more information, clusters formed are more meaningful and
closely associated. From the above observations, we can see that the proposed equi-cardinal
clustering algorithm and enhanced l-diversity clustering performs better than traditional
clustering when both information loss and degree of anonymization are considered.
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Figure 4.2. Information loss: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of clusters
for Yelp datase
4.8.2 Effect of the number of users
Our second experiment’s goal is to observe the performance comparison of equi-cardinal
clustering, enhanced l-diversity clustering, and traditional clustering under the influence of
the number of users. Both the datasets have a huge number of user data, and we have
only considered 10,000 users for our previous experiment. Clusters formed can be more
meaningful if we can provide a large number of points. Hence, in this set of experiments,
we vary the users from 2,000 to 20,000 and observe the performance difference. Since we are
focusing on a large dataset, we have considered a constant number of clusters, which is 100.
Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.7 shows the experimental results for the Yelp dataset, while Fig. 4.6 and
Fig. 4.8 shows the experimental results for the Facebook dataset.
From the experimental results of both the dataset results in Fig. 4.5, it is clear that
information loss is decreased by increasing the number of users. This is a simple observation
that due to the increase in data points, formed clusters are more meaningful, which means
less information loss. But it is to be observed that the difference in information loss between
traditional clustering and proposed clustering algorithms is also decreasing by increasing the
number of clusters. Initially, let us compare the performance enhancement of equi-cardinal
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Figure 4.3. Degree of anonymization: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of
clusters for Yelp dataset
clustering over traditional clustering. From Fig. 4.6, it can be observed that the degree of
anonymization is increased with the increase in the number of users. It can also be observed
that the increase in this value is almost exponential. With 2,000 users, the anonymization
is 6% using the Yelp dataset and 5% using the Facebook dataset. While with 20,000 users,
the value has increased to 30% using the Yelp dataset and 33% using the Facebook dataset.
Our next comparison is how enhanced l-diversity clustering further increases the per-
formance. From Fig. 4.7, it can be observed that the information loss is 0.3% more than
equi-cardinal and 0.5% more than traditional clustering at the maximum. But it can be
observed from Fig. 4.8, that the degree of anonymization is at most two times greater than
equi-cardinal clustering. As the number of users per cluster increases, there is a huge chance
of their attribute similarity.
4.8.3 Effect of the removal of sensitive attributes
Our third experiment’s goal is to observe the performance comparison of proposed
algorithms compared to the traditional algorithm when sensitive attributes are removed. All
the users in an OSN have sensitive attributes that they wish to keep private and not share
48
Figure 4.4. Degree of anonymization: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of
clusters for Yelp datase
publicly with third-party advertisers. But it is up to the OSN administrator to decide which
attributes are sensitive. In this experiment, we consider that each user provides a list of
attributes that he deems as sensitive. When all such data is collected from the network,
the OSN administrator has an aggregate list of which set of attributes are sensitive for the
entire network. From this set, he can remove the top ‘n’ sensitive attributes. In this set of
experiments, we have ranked all the attributes in the datasets according to their sensitivity
towards users privacy. We then started removing the top ‘n’ to observe their effect on the
anonymization process. Fig. 4.9 shows the experimental results of the Yelp dataset while
Fig. 4.10 shows the results of the Facebook dataset.
From Fig. 4.10, we can observe that there is a linear increment in the information loss
by removing the sensitive attributes. This observation can be seen in both the datasets. This
observation confirms that the information loss is increased irrespective of the dataset. Also,
the difference in information loss between naive clustering and the equi-cardinal clustering
method has increased by 70% in the Yelp dataset and 50% in the Facebook dataset. Similarly,
the difference in information loss between equi-cardinal clustering and the l-diverse enhanced
clustering method has increased by 90% in the Yelp dataset and 60% in the Facebook dataset.
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Figure 4.5. Information loss: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of users for
Yelp dataset
This is because as the number of attributes decreased, the intra-cluster distance between
various users increases. This leads to an increase in information loss in naive clustering.
While the clusters formed are more sparse, by removing the users from the nearest cluster
head and rearranging them into other clusters further increases the information loss.
It has to be noted that the degree of anonymization does not change as the sensitive
attributes are removed. This is because the ‘k value remains the same as there will be the
same number of users in each cluster. Also, the l-value represents the average number of
distinct values for each attribute. Sensitive attributes play a key role in clustering users.
Hence, the values on those attributes always have minimum distinct values. By removing
those sensitive attributes, we are not changing the average l-value, and hence our degree of
anonymization remains the same.
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Figure 4.6. Information loss: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of users for
Yelp datase
Figure 4.7. Degree of anonymization: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of
users for Yelp dataset
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Figure 4.8. Degree of anonymization: Affect of anonymization while modifying number of
users for Yelp datase
Figure 4.9. Information loss: Affect of anonymization while removing sensitive attributes
for Yelp dataset
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Figure 4.10. Information loss: Affect of anonymization while removing sensitive attributes
for FB dataset
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CHAPTER 5
PROTECTING PRIVACY OF MOBILE SOCIAL NETWORK
USERS IN PREFERENTIAL LOCATION BASED SERVICES
5.1 Introduction
As mobile devices’ usage has tremendously increased, Mobile social Networks (MSNs)
have become an integral part of our lives. According to the recent survey by Statista [66],
there are over 61% of users in North America use MSNs. It is expected that the number of
users who use MSNs reaches around 2.46 billion in 2017 and 3.02 billion in 2021. This number
is almost one-third of the current earth’s population. By integrating various technologies
and applications, social network providers market their products to reach a wide range
of users. Their applications are compatible with PDAs, smartphones, and many more.
The primary advantage of such MSN applications is that they provide various services like
LBS, virtual reality, online dating, and so on. Among them, location-based queries are the
most widely used service. The Online Social Network (OSN) has become a host for various
business advertisements. These business models include hotels, restaurants, vacation spots,
and sports. Users of OSN visiting these business models tend to review them, which in
turn helps other users to visit them. Hence the business owners maintain very detailed
information of their business, such as location, menu, phone numbers, and address. As the
mobile internet has exploded with its increasing speed, humongous mobile applications have
been developed in the past years. Similarly, all the OSN providers have their mobile-based
applications designed to provide a more convenient and faster way to access their accounts
on the go. MSN applications offer various advantages, including LBS, that help users to
search for nearby business models.
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LBSs have been gaining considerable popularity by the rapid advances in positioning
technologies, e.g., Global Position System (GPS), and the development of modern smart
devices with data communication capabilities. LBS query is the most common usage of any
mobile user. Users query for nearby restaurants, the distance between their position and
another place, and so on. A typical example of such a service is: Alice would like to query
for nearby restaurants. For such queries, all we need is the exact location but not the user
profile information. If the user and his location are identified by the attacker who can snoop
the network, then important information can be leaked. For example, Alice visits a cancer
hospital regularly and goes to a pharmacy at a particular location whenever she visits the
hospital. Imagine she has enabled LBS to any of her online social networking applications.
Then, the attacker can infer that Alice or a family member of hers has cancer, and also they
live in the neighborhood of the pharmacy she visits. This is a piece of crucial information
that should not be leaked. This attack can be seen in Fig. 5.1.
While mobile users enjoy LBS, they have to provide their real locations to the LSP,
which poses a severe threat to their privacy. It is to be observed that the users might not
always want to reveal their location information to others. The key to address these concerns
lies in the preservation of the users’ privacy when efficiently providing correct query results.
However, some LBS does consider user profile. For example, if a person searches for
a nearby restaurant, the result contains all the restaurants in the current area but sorted
according to the user history or interest. If the user preference is Asian cuisine, then the
results are sorted accordingly, and so on. Hence, accurate results for LBS is only possible if
we have exact location information and correct user profile. However, if we provide those to
the LBs query, then the privacy of the user is not maintained.
5.2 Problem definition
Let us denote a time series of social graphs as G0,G1,. . . .,GT . For each temporal graph
Gt = (V,E, Lt), the set of vertices is V and the set of edges is E. Lt is the location set of all
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Figure 5.1. Problems of existing LBS query with user privacy
the users at time ‘t’. For our theoretical analysis, we focus on undirected graphs where all
the |Et| edges are symmetric, i.e. (i, j) ∈ E if and only if (j, i) ∈ E.
In each temporal graph G, vertices denote the users and edges denote the connection
between them. Given a user ‘u’ with location, ‘l’ wants to search for LBS with users of
similar interests. Let us consider that there are ‘n’ users in the location radius ‘r’ each with
‘A’ attributes. We obfuscate user ‘u’ based on the equi-cardinal clustering and send out the
obfuscated user details ‘o’ with its generalized attributes.
U = u1, u2, u3, . . . ., un
ui = a1, a2, a3, . . . , aA
For a given ‘k’, this paper aims to obfuscate ‘u’ into ‘o’ in such a way that:
• There are at least ‘k’ users with the same attributes as ‘o’
• Minimize information loss
56
5.3 Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption method in which we can perform
operations on the ciphertext, and the results are valid on the plain text [67]. One of the
classic examples of homomorphic encryption is the RSA algorithm, in which multiplication
of two ciphertexts is equal to the value of encryption of the multiplication of corresponding
plain text messages. Hence, we can say that the RSA algorithm is homomorphic under
multiplication. Such an encryption technique is highly useful when we have only the ci-
phertext, and we do not want to reveal our plain message but perform operations on the
plaintext. Hence, homomorphic encryption is one of the best ways of implementing secure
data mining algorithms. In this project, we consider the Paillier encryption technique. This
encryption method is homomorphic under multiplication and addition, which are the only
two operations required to implement any data mining algorithm.
5.3.1 Paillier encrytpion
Pascal Paillier introduced the Paillier cryptosystem in 1999 [68]. It is asymmetric en-
cryption in which we generate a public and private key pair. We will see how to generate
such a key pair in algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Paillier Key Generation
1: Choose two large primes p, q such that GCD(pq, (p-1,q-1)) = 1
2: Compute n=pq and λ = LCM(p-1,q-1)
3: Select a random integer g such that g ∈ Z∗n2
4: Compute µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n where L(x) = x−1
n
5: Public Key (Encryption) is (n,g) and private key (Decryption) is(λ, µ)
Paillier Encryption has two distinctive properties.
Homomorphic under Addition:
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The product of two ciphertexts results in the addition of plain text messages.
D(E(m1, r1)× E(m2, r2)modn2) = m1 +m2modn
Homomorphic under Multiplication:
The product of two ciphertexts results in the addition of plain text messages.
D(E(m1, r1)
m2modn2) = m1 ×m2modn
D(E(m2, r2)
m1modn2) = m1 ×m2modn
5.4 Dynamic clustering based anonymization
This method is proposed in [69]. As the previous work suggests, by masking the user’s
actual location, we provide LBS services that cannot identify the user location. However, we
can still unmask the user’s private information such as name, gender, telephone number, and
what LBS requires. Hence, such location masking methods prove to be worthless in an OSN
application. Therefore, in this paper, we propose an approach where the user’s information
is masked rather than his location. By doing so, we cannot only provide accurate LBS
services but also mask the user’s details. To achieve this, we utilize the concept of profile
generalization. For example, a user who works as a product developer wants to search for
nearby restaurants. To answer this query, we do not require his occupation details. Hence,
instead of sending the query with occupation as a computer scientist, it would not affect the
results.
In the proposed method, we make such generalization over the entire profile to not
reveal any personal attributes and not to differentiate between private and public attributes.
To achieve this generalization, we utilize the clustering method. All the users in a given
location radius can be clustered based on their profiles, and the profile of the cluster head
is used as the profile for all the users in that cluster. By doing so, we are not randomly
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generalizing the profile to the highest hierarchy but are only using the hierarchy required for
that cluster.
We do not want to generalize every profile to a single master user profile. This is because
some LBS services might require profile details to provide better and personalized results.
For example, a query for nearby gaming areas might yield better results if it is provided
with the details of the user’s gaming history. It can sort the results based on his/her taste.
Hence, we only generalize the user’s profile to a certain extent so that the information loss
of the profile is minimum, and yet identifying the user out of ‘k’ other users is not possible.
So, our proposed method clusters users such that each cluster has ‘k’ users.
There are two ways to achieve the above-said results: pre-query clustering and post-
query clustering. Pre-query clustering is where we perform the clustering algorithm and
maintain the details of the cluster head’s masked profile at every user. These masked details
are used at the time of the query. This will make sure when the user asks for an LBS service,
there is no delay. On the other hand, post-query clustering performs clustering when the
users ask for an LBS query. This will remove the overhead of clustering beforehand but also
increases the response time. Also, with mobile users, pre-clustering has to handle mobility
overhead that can be eliminated with post-clustering. However, we assume that a user once
started querying for an LBS service might not stop with a single query but asks a series of
queries. Hence, performing post-query clustering affects the response time for every query,
and we might end up with a frustrated user resulting in losing the customer of the OSN.
Hence, in this paper, we propose a pre-query clustering method. Also, we take into account
the user’s mobility, and hence, the proposed method has to be dynamic to take into account
the leaving, arriving, and returning users. The proposed algorithm is visually represented in
Figure 5.2.
5.4.1 Dynamic clustering
We first assume that the entire coverage location of the OSN is divided into various
circles/hexagons. This can be observed in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.2. Proposed method
Figure 5.3. Dividing overall location into hexagons
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In Figure 5.3, the overall location (ol) is divided into various small locations (l1, l2, . . . .li).
Now, each location has a certain number of users. Every location is considered as a small
scale online social network with users only in that hexagon. However, as the users are mobile,
users tend to move from one location to another location or within the same location hexagon.
We consider the user’s speed and direction to estimate the users are leaving or arriving users
in the given location hexagon. As a first step, every location hexagon has to elect a leader to
perform any future algorithms. Once a leader is elected, he has to gain access to the user’s
profiles to perform clustering. Hence, a trusted leader is required. This election algorithm is
discussed in detail in section 5.4.2. As we consider the users’ mobility, it is to be noted that
users are always changing. It is also possible that the leader might leave the location. Hence,
for every ‘t’ second, we have to redo the entire process. However, if the users’ movement is
slow, and there is no change in the network at location li, then we do not have to repeat
the process. So, we redo the process only if the network has changed more than a certain
percentage. Also, every ‘t’ seconds is a vague number, and sometimes this might be a huge
number, and sometimes it is small. Hence, we consider the speed of the user’s to calculate
this time. The average speed of all the users in the area is S = 1
n
∑n
i=1 Si and the standard
deviation is σ = 1
n
∑n
i=1(Si − S).
To further simplify, we assume that all the user speeds follow a normal distribution. It
is a common assumption when n is large (n ≥30). Hence, in a normal distribution, all the
values fall in the range (S − 3 × σ, S + 3 × σ) with 99.73% probability. Hence, we assume
that our Smin = S − 3× σ and Smax = S + 3× σ. This gives us the information about the
fastest moving user who leaves the area early, and the slowest moving user who leaves last.
Hence, the average speed at a given location can also be written as the fastest-moving and
slow-moving user’s average speed.
Savg =
Smax + Smin
2
(5.1)
So, if we perform operations based on this average speed, we will capture the network
change. As we know, time = distance
speed
and distance is the maximum distance user has to cover
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in a location. For easier calculations, we assume hexagons to be circles, and hence maximum
distance is the diameter = 2× radius. So, for every time t = 2×r
savg
seconds, the network will
scan for any changes. If the network has changed more than x%, then we redo the clustering.
If the leader has left the location, then we have to redo the election process and clustering.
This whole process is summarized in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Dynamic Clustering
Input: U → Users, UT → User trust factor, r → Range, c → Center, UP → User profiles,
x → percentage change, and s → Speed
Output: UCH → User cluster head
While t% r×x
50×s == 0
If Head==NULL ‖ Head out of range == TRUE
Head ← Election(UT , r, c)
If ui == Head
UCH ← Cluster(UP )
endif
endif
If network change in percentage = x
If ui == Head
Cluster(UP )
endif
endif
endwhile
5.4.2 Trusted leader election
We have to perform the election to obtain a leader of the location. We utilize the
network leader election protocol proposed by Zhou et al. [70]. However, we need to define a
leadership score to find the leader with the maximum score.
LS = x× CP + (1− x)× TS + d
s
(5.2)
Where, LS is the leadership score, CP is the computation power, TS is the Trust score
provided by the server, d is the distance of the user from the hexagon center, and s is the
speed of the user.
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When we try to elect a leader in our scenario, there are three factors that we need to
consider. Firstly, a leadership score that will be provided by the server based on user history,
his connections, and many other factors. Many OSNs maintain such a score for validating
whether a user is real or fake. We use such information to elect a local leader. Secondly,
we need to identify a person who has better computational power. Since we need to cluster
all the users at the leader, we need a more powerful device. Hence, we consider this factor.
Lastly, we need to know the user’s distance from the center and his speed to calculate the
time he will be in the area. This is because if we elect a user who is on the edge of our
hexagon/circle, he will most probably leave the area even before the clustering is finished or
leave immediately afterward. We need such a user who stays in the local area for a maximum
amount of time.
To securely compute the leader among all the users in the network, we utilize the Paillier
encryption scheme provided in [68] and a secure minimum (SMIN) function proposed in
the [71]. We use the Paillier encryption system as it is homomorphic encryption that can
compute the difference between two numbers without finding their actual values. Algorithm
7 discusses the process in detail.
Algorithm 7 Trusted leader election
Input: global trust score values stored at the server, U ← list of users in the area, Epk ←
public encryption key generated using Paillier system.
Output: Leader
PE ← Epk(0)
Leader ← Epk(0)
For ui in U
Compute LSi for user i based on its computation power and the trust score
CE ← Epk(LSi)
PE ← SMIN(PE,CE)
If PE == CE
Leader ← Epk(i)
endif
endfor
At the server: Compute Dsk(Leader) to get the leader
Server informs all the users in the area about the Leader
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We utilize the Enhanced equi-cardinal clustering algorithm explained in Chapter 4 to
cluster the users with k-anonymity and l-diversity.
5.4.3 Anonymous LBS query
When a user ui has to send an LBS query, it first sends a request to the location leader.
The leader then identifies the cluster that ui belongs to cluster cj. Now, the leader responds
by sending the cj profile. When the user ui receives cj profile, it then sends the query by
providing cj profile and li location. This is shown in Fig. 5.4.
Figure 5.4. LBS query steps
By performing such an anonymous query, we do not mask the location, and hence, the
results are accurate. Also, if the attacker tries to sniff, he gets hold of a location where there
are ‘k’ users with the same profile, and hence, the user is k-anonymous.
5.5 Analysis
Definition 1: We say that G∗ is k-anonymous if:
p[uij = 1|u∗ij] ≤
1
k
(5.3)
Theorem 1: To minimize information loss at a given time and with the given number
of users, ‘k’ should be chosen in a way such that k =
√
n
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Proof. Let us assume that all the users in a given cluster are equidistant from its cluster
center. According to the objective, we have to: Minimize IL and Maximize k i.e., Minimize
(IL+ 1
k
) ∑k
i=1
∑ni
j=1(xij − xl)′(xij − xl)∑k
i=1
∑ni
j=1(xij − x)′(xij − x)
+
1
k
(5.4)
We are also assuming that each cluster has an equal number of users. Hence, the number
of users in each cluster is k, and the number of clusters is n/k.
∑n/k
i=1
∑ni
j=1(xij − xl)′(xij − xl)∑n/k
i=1
∑ni
j=1(xij − x)′(xij − x)
+
1
k
(5.5)
By substituting the constant distance values and summing over, we get:
k × n
k
× n+ 1
k
(5.6)
n2 +
1
k
(5.7)
To minimize this function, we take a single derivative and equate it to 0.
2× n− 1
k2
= 0 (5.8)
2n =
1
k2
(5.9)
k = logn (5.10)
Theorem2: Achieving k-Anonymity is NP-Hard
Proof: Given a graph G = (V ;E), the problem is to determine whether the edge-set E
can be partitioned into subsets E1, E2, ... in such a way that each Ei generates a subgraph of
G isomorphic to the complete graph Kn on n vertices. Our main result is that the problem
EPn is NP-complete for each n ≥ 3. From this, we deduce that several other edge-partition
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problems are NP-complete. To show that EPn is NP-complete, we will exhibit a polynomial
reduction from the known NP-complete problem 3SAT, which is defined as follows. A set of
clauses C = {C1, C2, ..., Cr} in variables u1, u2, ..., us is given, each clause Ci consisting of
three literals li,1 , li,2 , li,3 where a literal li,j is either a variable uk or its negation uk. The
problem is to determine whether C is satisfiable, that is, whether there is a truth assignment
to the variables which simultaneously satisfy all the clauses in C. A clause is satisfied if
exactly of its literals has value “true”.
∑
j=1tok
li,j = 1 (5.11)
Hence any final solution should contain exactly ‘k’ vertices and therefore is an edge
partition problem, which is NP-complete.
Theorem 3: A network change of x% is equivalent to the time difference
t =
rx
100
× ( 1
smin
+
1
smax
) (5.12)
Where, ‘r’ is the radius of the clustering area ‘s’ is the average speed of the max speed and
min speed users.
Proof. If a user ui travels at a speed of si, the maximum time taken for the user to cover
distance ‘d’ is:
t =
d
si
(5.13)
The maximum distance that the user has to travel out of the clustering area is the
diameter of the circle: 2× r. Hence, t = 2×r
si
.
Out of all the users in the given area, the minimum time taken to cross the entire
clustering area is by the user whose speed is maximum.
t =
2× r
smax
(5.14)
Similarly, the maximum time taken would be by the slowest traveling user.
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t =
2× r
smin
(5.15)
Hence, the average time for all the users to travel out of the clustering area is:
t =
2×r
smin
+ 2×r
smax
2
= r × 1
smin
+
1
smax
(5.16)
However, this time holds true for 100% of the users to travel out of the clustering area.
But we need to find time for x% of the users traveled out of the area.
t = r × 1
smin
+
1
smax
× x
100
(5.17)
t =
rx
100
× ( 1
smin
+
1
smax
) (5.18)
5.6 Performance metrics
5.6.1 Profile generalization
Our aim in this proposed method is to generalize the user profile rather than generalize
the location information. Hence, we need to know how much of the profile has been gener-
alized. It is a common understanding that if we generalize all the user’s profiles to a single
profile that is profile is generalized 100%, then the privacy maintained is high. However,
the LBS results will be far from accurate. Also, if we reveal the profile is not changed at
all that is the profile generalization is 0%, there is a chance that the user is identified by
an attacker correctly. Hence, we need to have a mechanism to see how much the profile is
generalized and how much privacy is maintained with that generalization. To do that, we
provide a profile generalization calculation method.
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profile generalization of user ui =
dist(ui, Cui)
dist(ui, GP )
× 100 (5.19)
Where ui is the user profile, Cui is the cluster that the user belongs to, and GP is the
general profile.
5.6.2 Accuracy
It is essential to understand how accurate the results are with the profile generalization.
Since we have LBS queries, a query that takes location information will give us accurate re-
sults. This is because we are sending exact location information in our LBS query. However,
we take into account the user’s profile to sort the results according to the user’s interest for
a preferential search. This is how we ensure that the results are relevant to the user and not
generalized results. We use an algorithm proposed by [72] to perform the preferential search.
This algorithm lets us filter the results further based on the user profile. We measure the
accuracy of the preferential search results by using the below method:
Accuracy =
number of different results
total number of results
× 100 (5.20)
5.6.3 Execution time
It is essential to understand how much computation time is required for the algorithm
to run. This is because LBS queries are real-time, and the user can request a query at any
point in time. Although our algorithm is not a post-query method, we do update the clusters
based on the user movement. So, it is possible that the user might request for a query at
the exact moment that the election and clustering method starts executing. Hence, we need
to understand what is the execution time for these methods.
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5.7 Experimental results
To measure the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, we have considered a social
network based synthetic dataset. We have used Mockaroo realistic data generation gener-
ator [73] to generate this synthetic dataset. This dataset contains 25 attributes for each
user. These attributes include the occupation, highest level of education, university/school
attended, places visited, and the city he/she lives in currently. We have considered only
users from the USA and hence all the cities and universities belong to the USA. This dataset
also has a user’s current latitude and longitude information and the speed and direction he
travels in.
To further analyze the effectiveness of our prosed algorithm, we have considered two
other algorithms. The first one is a spatial cloaking mechanism [44]. This protocol is based
on the distributed model that computes a cloak area which covers all collaborative peers
to satisfy the spatial k-anonymity. This approach is different from existing methods as it
does not rely on any intermediate anonymizer; any collaborative user does not have to trust
each other. It possesses stronger robustness in the scenarios with multiple initiators and the
scenarios with a collision. First, a mobile user initiates the LBS, searching k-1 companions
and collaborating to form a cloak area, which covers k peers according to a certain degree
of k-anonymity, and these peers exchange information through an ad-hoc network. The
initiator randomly selects a peer in the group as an agent who sends query messages with
location information on behalf of the initiator to the LBS server. Upon this request, the
LBS server seeks the desired information in the database and returns appropriate answers
to the initiator through the agent. Finally, the initiator selects a satisfactory solution.
Another algorithm is a grid-based cloaking mechanism proposed by [45]. This algo-
rithm supports both k-anonymity and l-diversity. In this algorithm, a minimum grid area
is obtained for every user. For every user, we start by expanding the area until we find
‘k’ users (k-anonymity) with ‘l’ different attributes (l-diversity). This helps in reducing any
unnecessary computations. This cloaking algorithm creates a temporary cloaking area by
expanding its region. Starting at a two-dimensional coordinate system where the user is
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currently residing, it expands in the shape of a hexagon by one unit at a time. Once a step
of expansion is made, the algorithm compares the ‘k’ and ‘l’ values. If anyone of the values
does not match, then the expansion step continues. The algorithm comes to a termination
point, once it finds the desired area. To efficiently perform this algorithm, a grid structure is
used for storing the user location information. A post pruning technique is used to eliminate
any unnecessary region expansion. Since the k-value is higher than l-value, there is a high
probability that if we find k-users, we tend to obtain the l-value. Thus it helps to create the
minimum cloaking region more efficient grid structure is maintained to store buildings and
users.
Also, we have utilized the Yelp Fusion API for generating the LBS results. Yelp Fusion
API provides a mechanism where we can search for a business by providing the location
information. However, results are only sorted according to the distance with the actual
location we sent in. As we are not modifying the location information and also focusing on
the profile based LBS search, we are utilizing an algorithm proposed by [72]. This algorithm
lets us filter the results further based on the user profile.
All the experiments were conducted on Windows 10 operating system with Intel Core
(TM) Duo 2.66 GHz CPU,12 GB Memory, and Java platform. Each observation has been
averaged over 50 instances. We have devised three different experimental metrics to observe
the performance of the proposed method. Each experiment considers the various settings
of users and attributes. Evaluation metrics are discussed in section IV as a part of the
proposed method. Three metrics need to be observed in each experiment: Information Loss
in percentage (IL), Execution Time (ET), and Accuracy of the LBS results.
5.7.1 The effect of change in the number of areas
Our first experiment’s goal is to observe how the initial partition of areas affects our
proposed algorithm. We could consider an example like this. Since the dataset is over the
entire USA, it is a concern if we want to divide areas that represent cities or states. If we
divide the whole area into states, our number of areas would be less. However, this might
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not produce good results, as we are trying to combine people from various cities. However,
if we consider the entire area to be divided into cities, this might result in more processing
time.
Figure 5.5. Effect of information loss while modifying number of areas
Information loss is calculated based on the amount of generalization that the user profile
has undergone. As our intention in the proposed method is to reduce that information loss,
you can observe that the IL is maintained at 15-20%. Although, from Figure 5.5, it can
be seen that information loss has gone up to 35%. This is because, as the number of areas
less, the number of users per cluster is more. As the users are more and their profiles are
entirely different, information loss keeps increasing. However, other methods like spatial
cloaking and grid-based cloaking achieve anonymity by just performing the location-based
clustering and not based on the profile. That is why their information loss is double that of
our proposed method as the profile is nowhere considered for clustering.
Execution times are shown in Figure 5.6. Execution time depends on the k-means
convergence. If there are few users, then the k-means algorithm converges faster and faster.
Also, it depends on user profiles. If there are 100 users and we want 10 clusters, then
running k-means on their profiles is much easier as there will be at least ten users with a
similar profile. However, it is not the same as the location. As users should be clustered
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Figure 5.6. Effect of execution time while modifying number of areas
into different areas based on their location, profiles might be completely different, and hence,
convergence takes longer.
Table 5.1. Accuracy while modifying number of areas
No. of areas Proposed
Method
Spatial Cloaking Grid-Based Cloak-
ing
5 81.2 53.9 54.2
10 82.3 55.17 56.2
15 84.5 57.9 60.3
20 85.9 59.3 65.4
30 87.9 60.2 68.8
50 90.4 62.4 70.9
Accuracy and information loss can be related. Results for the accuracies are shown in
Table 5.1. With minimum information loss, a profile-based LBS query gives better results.
Our proposed method reaches a maximum of 92% accuracy. However, grid-based clustering
also performs well in this scenario. This is because the LBS query greatly depends on location
information, and grid-based generalization of location is much more efficient than spatial
clustering. However, it is not on par with our method as the location is still generalized and
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not accurate location. Even with the profile based sorting, our algorithm provides very high
accuracy.
5.7.2 The effect of change in the number of clusters
The goal of this experiment is to observe the performance enhancement of the proposed
algorithm. We observe the effect of varying the number of clusters. By increasing the
number of clusters, we decrease the number of users per cluster. Additionally, by decreasing
the number of clusters, we increase the number of users per cluster. By increasing the
number of clusters per user, we are also increasing the chance of having more related users
in the cluster. Although this might increase the generalization, it is also possible that the
clusters are more meaningful and are more related. We observe the effect of this change in
the following Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.7. Effect of information loss while modifying number of clusters
As the k value increases, the number of users per cluster decreases. That means we
have more opportunities to cluster very tight clustering. Hence, information loss can be
greatly reduced by increasing the ‘k’ value. However, we are also compromising on the
level of accuracy provided to the user. If there are 100 users and we want to achieve 100-
anonymity, then each user is a cluster by itself. In this scenario, although information loss
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is 0, we are not providing anonymity to the user. Hence, we should choose a ‘k’ such that
it provides a good anonymity level and lesser information loss. By this experiment, we
found k=20 provides us with 20% information loss. Hence, we maintained that value for
other experiments. Additionally, it can also be observed that information loss for spatial
cloaking is almost 2.5 times our proposed method information loss. This is again because
the clustering happens based on the user location information.
Figure 5.8. Effect of execution time while modifying number of clusters
Accuracies are shown in Table 5.2. With the same explanation as in Experiment 1, as
the number of users per cluster decreases, clustering based on profiles converges faster, and
clustering based on the location takes more time. However, as k=150, the execution time
for all the three methods are almost the same. This is because the number of users per area
is approximately 500, and users per cluster are approximately 3. Hence, there is not much
difference in clustering by either location or profile as the number of users is minimal.
As the information loss is at least two times lesser than other methods, our accuracy is
also almost two times higher than other methods.
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Table 5.2. Accuracy while modifying number of clusters
k Proposed
Method
Spatial Cloaking Grid-Based
Cloaking
10 79.8 51.4 65.7
20 81.2 53.2 66.9
50 83.9 55.7 70.3
100 86.7 59.6 71.4
150 89.1 62.5 73.5
5.7.3 Mobility
Our third experiment’s goal is to observe the performance of the proposed algorithm
when the users are mobile. The first two experiments focus on the initial clustering and
generalization of users’s profile even before the user starts moving. However, when the user
moves and requests real-time LBS queries, it is essential to maintain the profile generalization
along with k-anonymity at the current location. To analyze this, we are considering the
algorithm performance at various time instances. Results are shown in Figure 5.9. It is
to be noted that the user requests continuous LBS queries. However, we only perform re-
clustering when the clustered areas are modified by more than 40%. These experiments will
give us an idea that if we take the snapshot of our algorithm performance at random times,
how the information loss and execution time changes.
Also, we tried to observe how the accuracy changes if the re-clustering happens when
there is a percentage change of existing clusters less than 50%.
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Figure 5.9. Effect of accuracy while the users are mobile and re-clustering at x% change
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
6.1 Preserving privacy in continuous LBS queries
As explained in chapter 5, LBS has gained massive popularity in recent times. Almost
all the MSNs now provide their own LBS services in different ways. As customers, we utilize
those features even without noticing them. For example, Facebook offers various services
that include finding nearby sellers; that is, we can find nearby people selling their items on
Facebook. Also, we can find nearby restaurants and filter them based on the user ratings.
Similarly, Instagram provides “Geotag” option to mobilize and engage more local followers.
Dating networks like Tinder allows users to find nearby users with similar interests/profile.
All such scenarios increase the privacy concerns of social network users.
6.1.1 Introduction
All the mobile devices in recent times are enabled with GPS location tracking. By
utilizing such technology, users can query for many places in their vicinity, like restaurants
and shopping, without providing their location every time manually. With the introduction
of local businesses over social networks, and reviews of nearby places, users of the social
network are using these location-based services with their social profiles. This geotagging
is also used to find friends in a given area and notify them like Facebook’s Places, Google
Plus, and Loopt.
These location sharing applications have many uses. For example, the functionality
“Find Friends” on an iPhone lets users know where their loved ones are. An application
like “Find my Phone” helps people track their mobile phones if they are lost. This allows
users to save a lot of time, effort, and money. This location sharing feature is also helpful
in smartwatch applications. On a smartwatch, like FitBit, and apple watch, it allows users
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to track their steps and walking distance. Hence, location-sharing is a means of identifying
user’s health. On a kid’s smartwatch, location sharing can be life-saving. It helps parents
find their kids’ location and intimate them if they are in any danger area. Also, using real-
time location can identify crimes going on in the area, new, and weather alerts, and many
more. Hence, continuous location sharing has many advantages, and people are using these
applications without realizing their privacy concerns.
The current technology for location-based social networking systems depends on a cen-
tral server. This server keeps tracks of user movements and location trajectories that the
user took over a period of time. By storing such information, we violate the privacy concerns
of the users [74] [75] [76] [77]. Previous research on such privacy concerns aims at disguis-
ing the location information before sending it to the central server [78] [39] [79] [80].This
location granularity generalization technique might be a good idea. However, if the server
collects data over time, we reveal the user location trajectory information. And this still is
not solved. Other methods focusing on protecting the privacy of user location is through se-
cure message exchange between the user and his friends [81] [82]. These methods, although,
are secure and private, comes at the cost of communication overhead. Since we deal with
mobile devices, the availability of power is often a huge problem, and we can only obtain
approximate results [83].
The primary concern in LBS queries is that these queries are not independent or isolated
queries. When users enable location services for their social network, their precise location
information is shared with the network servers for providing better and accurate results. As
the name suggests, continuous LBS send precise location information at all times. Hence,
an attacker who seeks to find a user’s trajectory finds it easier to identify a future location if
the current location is compromised. Therefore, the problem of continuous LBS arises and
is more threatening to the user privacy than an isolated LBS query.
6.1.2 Problem statement
Let us assume a user ui sends his LBS query qi = {(xi, yi), si, di, ki, uAmin}, where
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(xi, yi) is the precise location of user ui , si is the speed of user ui, di is the direction
of travel for user ui, ki is the anonymity level requested by user ui, and uAmin is the privacy
area constraint by user ui.
Amin, a minimum privacy area, is to determine the smallest area where a random loca-
tion and the user’s exact location has more probability of colliding. Hence, every user has a
desired “minimum privacy area” such that the anonymity area is always higher than Amin.
6.1.3 Proposed method
Privacy through k-anonymity: Various research methods [84] [85] [86] have adopted
the concept of trusted third party (TTP) for providing user location privacy. The primary
aim of such methods is to reduce the risk of privacy disclosure in an LBS system. This TTP
that acts as an anonymizer is a middle-tier between a user and the LBS server, Location Ser-
vice Provider (LSP). An anonymizer takes in the original user query with the actual precise
location and sends the query with the anonymized location to the server. The functionality
of an anonymizer is illustrated in Figure 6.1. k-anonymity is provided at the anonymizer.
When the anonymizer generalizes the actual location, it makes sure that there are at least
k − 1 other users in the given location. To provide such a functionality, an anonymizer
utilizes various methods proposed in [78] [86] [82]. When such a query is sent to the LSP, it
generates the Points Of Interest (POIs) as a result of the anonymized location and sends it
back to the TTP. It then refines the results based on the actual location and sends accurate
results back to the user.
Figure 6.1. Functionality of an anonymier
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An anonymizer collects a user’s location information and analyzes their desired
anonymity level. Based on those levels, it forms clusters and generalizes the location ac-
cordingly. There are different methods proposed on how an anonymizer changes the location
information to provide the desired k-anonymity to the users. Authors in [87] have proposed
a technique where ‘k’ dummy locations are generated by considering that the side informa-
tion is easily accessible by the adversaries. Another work by [88] proposed a method called
“ICliqueCloak”. This method aims to maintain maximum cliques incrementally to provide
k-anonymity at all times.
However, specific methods have analyzed the use of k-anonymity and cloaking mecha-
nisms. In [89], the authors have developed a mechanism to generate dummy locations based
on a virtual grid. They have analyzed that k-anonymity alone does not guarantee privacy as
the user distribution, and density affects the probability. Also, k-anonymity based cloaking
methods are better for a snapshot of time as they cannot prevent the attacks that focus on
user trajectory rather than individual location.
Privacy through deep learning: This research aims to ensure that the attackers
cannot learn the trajectory that a given user follows. For this, we need to understand how
such trajectories are predicted. Neural networks and deep learning methods are playing a
significant role in understanding these paths. For example, authors in [90] [91] have proposed
methods based on neural networks to predict user trajectories given their history. In social
networks, this history, along with user profile, plays a major role. To explain a scenario, let
us assume a user who travels from point x to point y every day during weekdays at 9 AM
and back from point y to point x at 5 PM. This clearly indicates that point x is the user’s
home, and point y is the user’s office/school. However, if the user has been looking for places
to visit in another city and have booked a flight ticket, it is most likely that the user will
not follow the trajectory x to y during those vacation days. This gives the advertisers to
advertise certain restaurants or places in that new location during those vacation days. This
learning is all possible using deep learning methods.
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6.1.4 Challenges/Requirements
1. Shot-term linkability: If a user sends two or more messages in a time frame, δt, an
attacker should not identify that they originate from the same source. This ensures
that Sybil attacks have no effect over user privacy as they tend to generate a huge
number of summy queries over a short period.
2. Long-term linkability: Two or more messages from the same user should also be
unlinkable if the time frame is large. This is because as the user tends to move, his
location area is revealed. That is, any privacy-preserving mechanism can only increase
the location granularity by a certain amount as the accuracy of LBS queries should
not affect. Hence, if the attacker knows that the user is in area ‘a1’ at time ‘t1’, and
area ‘a2’ at time ‘t2’ and over time, the attacker might also learn that the area ‘a1’ is
repeating multiple times in a day. Then, the attacker can deduce that the area ‘a1’ is
either the user’s home or work location with a high probability.
3. Accuracy: With any anonymity implemented, we should guarantee that the results
if the LBS query by the user are accurate. As the market is highly competitive, if the
results are not accurate, the user might not use the social network, and that affects
the business.
4. Acheiveing k-anonymity: The aim of k-anonymity should always be that the prob-
ability of finding a user in the anonymized are always greater than or equal to 1
k
. This
should take into account multiple criteria:
(a) Density of the area
(b) User distribution in the area
(c) User’s profiles
(d) User’s LBS query history
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6.2 Privacy preserving data aggregation in Medical IoT network
Internet of Things (IoT) has gained massive popularity in recent times due to the devel-
opment of many smart devices. Smart homes are connected with voice-controlled intelligent
personal assistants, and smart cities are the way of achieving solutions to many problems,
including traffic control, accident detection through v2v communication, and many more.
Utilizing the services of such devices has made life simpler and provided ease of access.
Hence, the utilization of such smart devices has become an integral part of many people’s
lives.
The ultimate goal for any technology is not just to make life easier but to improve the
quality of life. Focus on health improvement has never been more important than in times
of COVID-19. The only current solution to such a pandemic is to maintain a healthier life.
According to [92], the global healthcare sector will invest nearly $400 billion in IoT devices,
software, and services. Scarpato et al. [93] provide us details about how IoT networks of
heterogeneous sensors will augment the medical system. It is crucial to notice that the
e-healthcare IoT system, called the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT), contains various
sensors that collect data over time and across various locations. These sensors include
wearable sensors like smartphones and smartwatches, ECG sensors, diabetes sensors, and
pulmonary disease monitoring sensors that provide heterogeneous data collection. With
an increase in several sensors, the medical field is benefitting by improving and providing
many essential services. Telemedicine, telesurgery, and automated tracking of patients have
never been more critical than in current times. However, the availability of such personal
and detailed data might reveal sensitive information if fallen into the wrong hands. Hence,
privacy in IoMT devices is vital.
Data mined from the data collected from these sensors is essential to identify problems
with the patients. Imagining these sensors as basic building blocks, communication between
these blocks form a network. Many problems, including routing, topology control, are still
an issue in IoT networks. However, one of the significant concerns in IoT networks is the
data aggregation problem. The problem is due to the lack of processing capacity and low
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power availability at individual sensors. Hence, raw data is collected and aggregated at a
central node. This problem has been studied in detail in some of our previous works [94] [95].
We have focused on creating an energy-efficient solution for data aggregation models in IoT
networks. Nevertheless, the problem of raw data being sent over to these central nodes still
poses privacy issues. Hence, it is important to provide a privacy-preserving data aggregation
scheme.
6.2.1 Problem statement
Sensor devices: Let us consider an IoMt network with ‘n’ sensor nodes {S1, S2, ..., Sn}.
Ssi is the sensor value at node i, Ss is the aggregated sensor value. Ssi values are periodically
reported to a trusted third party (TTP) device like a mobile edge computing (MEC) device,
or Fog device. Hence, it is important to note that:
• |Ssi | = n
• |Ssi | ∩ |Ssj | = φ
•
n⋃
i=1
Ssi = Ss
Every sensor node Si, has a storage capacity Sci , computation power Spi , and energy
Sei . These three components determine what algorithms can be executed at these individual
devices. In general, we assume that the power is minimal, the storage capacity of each sensor
is for a limited time, and the energy is sufficient to transfer data to a TTP device.
TTP device: In any hybrid IoT network, we have a local TTP device that collects
data from the sensors in its area and performs a local analysis before forwarding it to the
central server. Hence, if ‘n’ sensors are divided into ‘k’ area, we have ‘k’ TTP devices
collecting data from these Sk subset of sensor nodes. Let us assume Ti is the TTP device
and Sti is the subset of sensor nodes communicating with Ti.
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6.2.2 Proposed method
The overall architecture of an IoMT network can be observed in Figure 6.2. Since the
sensor nodes do not have enough storage and processing power, they often communicate
with an intermediate device. These devices regularly collect data from the sensors, process,
and forward the information deduced to the central server. We consider two important such
devices: Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) device, and Fog device.
Figure 6.2. Overall architecture oif an IoMT network
MEC devices: MEC is a key technology in 5G communications. It has been proposed
to address various issues, including storage, processing, and network resources. The main
idea of a MEC device is to deploy it in a highly connected IoT network. This way, a MEC
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device collects data from all the sensors in its area with the least latency and high reliability.
Researchers in this area have focused on developing algorithms to solve the privacy-preserving
health monitoring system [96], integrating healthcare to the monitoring system [97], and data
mining of distributed health data [98].
Fog devices: Cisco introduced the concept of fog computing in 2012, aiming to
pre-process parts of the problem and act as an edge device. The primary idea behind
introducing fog computing is to reduce communication costs in a high volume environment.
These devices also act as an edge device to collect information. However, fog devices have
become a source of security vulnerabilities in the recent past. Several privacy-preserving
data aggregation models have been proposed using fog-enhanced IoT network [97] [98] [99].
These methods only focus on two types of aggregation problems: sum and mean. However,
we intend to focus on proposing a privacy-preserving data mining mechanism that aims to
store the information at this fog device, rather than collect individual sensor data.
6.2.3 Challenges/Requirements
Analysis of aggregated data will result in a better understanding of the patient and
thus aid the doctor in treating accordingly. However, we have to address specific problems,
including:
1. Data Confidentiality: Only patient and authorized users should be able to see the
data. Methods like Homomorphic encryption [99] and [100] have been proposed to solve
this issue. However, homomorphic encryptions often involve heavy communication
costs, and the power in these IoMT sensors is limited.
2. Data Privacy: Previous solutions to privacy challenges can be broadly classified into
two categories. The first category is where we introduce noise into the system such
that the utility loss is minimum [101] [102]. The second category includes designing
lightweight cryptosystems that address both security and privacy challenges [103] [104].
Both these solutions do not provide realistic solutions to the challenge of untrusted
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Fog/MEC servers exist. Also, utility loss sometimes leads to quandary as we deal with
sensitive health data on which doctors depend on the patient’s treatment.
3. Fault Tolerance: In a real-world scenario, we have to take into account that there
might be a failed data transmission from the sensor to the cloud/ local server. This
loss of data might affect the analysis that is done in the cloud. However, this failed
transmission could be due to the man-in-the-middle attack that could read partial data.
Hence, the developed mechanism should consider the fault tolerance that the fog/MEC
based cloud system can handle [105] and how to preserve privacy while transmitting
data.
6.3 Privacy preserving friend discovery in MSN
6.3.1 Introduction
One of the functionalities of a mobile social network is to connect to people in the
current area. Dating social networks like Tinder, Match, and Bumble find people with
similar interests in the user’s area. These features also help us find groups with similar
interests near the user’s location. This kind of business model attracts many youngsters who
love to meet new people. Hence, this can also be called as Proximity-based Mobile Social
Network (PMSN). As with any social network, it is always hard to find out who is a real
user and who is an attacker. Hence, the privacy of a user is compromised when such a public
friend finder profile is leaked. As this model is most cost-effective, many social network
providers often ignore the user’s privacy details. Although the communication is secure, we
might want to consider that an attacker is posing as a legitimate user and hence can gain
information on users in his area. Some works have proposed privacy-preserving schemes in
profile matching [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] [111]. However, these methods rely heavily on
encryption methods and hence can have a high computational overhead when the number of
users increases. Hence, it is not practical to apply for a mobile network user as these devices
are not meant to process such heavy computations.
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PMSN is a network of finding many friends with the least connections and thereby
reducing the information exchange. Therefore, identifying the user nodes with the highest
impact is a crucial first step. However, the problem arises when the data exchange occurs
between a user and an untrusted stranger. The stranger might have a valid public key,
but the intention of the stranger with user data is unknown. Hence, a viable solution is to
provide a profile matching algorithm that does not involve in information exchange between
two random users. This profile matching could be based on public attributes or private. By
only using public attributes, we might often not generate a good matching profile. Hence,
we do consider some sensitive attributes such as location, health conditions, and movie
interests. Some of the recent research on private matching for PMSN has addressed this
issue [106] [109] [112] [113] [114]. Researchers have considered matching based on a given
sensitive attribute, such as interests [106], friends [109], and disease symptoms [112]. The
idea behind these techniques is to find the intersection of profiles without disclosing actual
information. This is a well-known problem, and homomorphic encryption addresses it. How-
ever, as we discussed previously, communication costs increase dramatically using encryption
techniques. Therefore, a light-weight privacy-preserving profile intersection algorithm should
be proposed.
6.3.2 Problem statement
Consider two user, Alice with profile u =< u1, . . . , ud > and Bob with profile v =<
v1, . . . , vd >. Let us assume a intersection function, f, calculated over two profiles f(u, v).
We also define various privacy levels and based on which the calculation of f(u, v) depends.
6.3.3 Related work
PMSN can be categorized into two categories:
• FNP approach
• Cryptographic based approach
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FNP approach: In this scheme [115], we have a client and server communication,
as shown in Fig. 6.3. Users behave like clients, and the server takes care of matching
profiles. At the server, an intersection set is calculated such that the client gets the result
while the server learns nothing. In another method, Kissner et al. [116] implemented profile
matching with more operations, including set intersection, union, cardinality, and over-
threshold operations [117].
Figure 6.3. Example of a PMSN application
Another work proposed by Ye et al. [118] extends the before mentioned FNP scheme for
a distributed environment. However, the complexity of this algorithm is too large. Therefore,
another method has been proposed to reduce the complexity by Dachman-Soled et al. [119].
Other works like [120] [121] [122] built oblivious pseudorandom functions for matching profiles
of two users. By implementing such functions, communicational and computational efficiency
has been improved. Li et al. [106] implemented profile matching according to three increasing
privacy levels: i) revealing the common attribute set of the two users; ii) revealing the size
of the common attribute set; and iii) revealing the size rank of the common attribute sets
between a user and its neighbors. They considered an honest-but-curious (HBC) adversary
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model, which assumes that users try to learn more information than allowed by inferring from
the profile matching results, but honestly following the protocol. They applied secure multi-
party computation, the Shamir secret sharing scheme, and the homomorphic encryption
scheme to ensure user profiles’ confidentiality.
Cryptographic based approach: In this category, each user is represented in terms
of a vector [123] [124] [125]. Each vector value is nothing but the user’s attribute values.
Hence, a simple naive approach is to compute two vectors’ product to see the matching of
profiles. However, as to maintain the privacy of each individual attribute value, authors
in [126] [127] have adopted secure two-party computations. Two of the most recent works in
this area include [124] [128] . Authors in [124] utilizes the concept of the dot product. Let the
user 1 has an attribute vector ‘u’ and user 2 has an attribute vector ‘v’. By computing the
DotProduct(u, v), the authors measure the proximity of two attribute vectors. Another work
by [128] improves on the previous solution by enabling verifiable, secure computation. The
improved protocol only reveals whether the dot product is above or below a given threshold.
The threshold value is selected by the user who initiates the profile matching. They pointed
out the potential anonymity risk of their protocols; an adversary may adaptively adjust the
threshold value to narrow down the value range of the victim profile quickly. Thus, it is
required that the threshold value must be larger than a predefined lower bound (a system
parameter) to guarantee user anonymity.
6.3.4 Challenges/Requirements
1. Definition 1: Level-I privacy
When the protocol ends, Alice only learns f(u, v), and Bob only learns f.
2. Definition 2: Level-II privacy
When the protocol ends, Alice only learns f(u, v), and Bob learns nothing.
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3. Definition 3: Level-III privacy
When the protocol ends, Alice learns if f(u, v) < τA holds for her personal threshold
τA without learning f(u, v), and Bob learns nothing.
If Alice and Bob both faithfully follow the protocol execution, which corresponds to the
honest-but-curious (HBC) model [8], neither of them can learn the other’s personal profile
for all three privacy levels. In addition, with level-I privacy, although Bob cannot learn
f(u, v), he learns the matching metric f chosen by Alice. In contrast to level-I privacy, level-
II privacy additionally requires that Bob learn nothing other than f ∈ F . Finally, level-III
privacy discloses the least amount of information by also hiding f(u, v) from Alice.
There might also be some external attackers (other than Alice and Bob) trying to infer
users profile or disrupt PMSN operations. For example, an external attacker may eavesdrop
on the messages between Alice and Bob. All our protocols can ensure that the eavesdroppers
are completely blind to Alice and Bob’s profiles and the matching metric(s) chosen by them,
which will all be encrypted during the protocol execution.
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